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The report ´Equivalence and Mutual Recognition in Trade Arrangements ² 
Relevance for the WTO and the Codex Alimentarius Commissionµ contains five 
chapters.  
Chapter 1 discusses the concepts of equivalence, mutual recognition and 
harmonization and how these concepts can be applied to facilitate trade. The 
important premise for this discussion is the fact that national regulatory systems, 
including regulations, standards and procedures for ensuring compliance with regu-
lations and standards (cf. conformity assessment procedures), may cause impedi-
ments to world trade. Harmonization is one way of facilitating trade. The goal of 
harmonization is uniformity of trade measures on an international basis. The con-
cept of equivalence, on the other hand, is based on the fact that regulatory goals, 
e.g., in relation to health and food quality, in practice may be fulfilled by the use of 
different kinds of measures. Trade barriers can thus be removed and the products 
can be accepted on the basis that they fulfil the relevant regulatory objectives ² 
even though regulatory differences persist. Mutual recognition can simply mean 
that two or more parties mutually accept each other·s rules or conformity 
assessment procedures, i.e., the process through which products are evaluated for 
compliance with the rules. Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) primarily in-
volve conformity assessment procedures. Under these agreements the parties 
mutually accept each other·s conformity assessment procedures as equivalent in order to ensure 
compliance with prevailing regulatory requirements. Normally, an MRA is a 
voluntary agreement between governmental conformity assessment bodies.  
Chapter 2 presents and analyses the work on equivalence and mutual recognition 
in the TBT Committee of the WTO (dealing with technical regulations, standards 
and conformity assessment), the SPS Committee of the WTO (dealing with mea-
sures related to food safety and animal and plant health) and in the U.N. food 
standardization body Codex Alimentarius Commission. The concepts of equiva-
lence and mutual recognition and the way they can apply under WTO rules, have 
been discussed for many years in both the TBT and SPS committees. However, the 
SPS Committee has advanced the furthest with regard to equivalence assessments. 
This has resulted in a Committee Decision on the implementation of Article 4 on 
Equivalence of the SPS Agreement. Furthermore, on the request of the SPS 
Committee, the Codex Alimentarius Commission has developed Guidelines on the 
Judgement of Equivalence of Sanitary Measures Associated with Food Inspection and 
Certification Systems (adopted in 2003). These guidelines supplement the Guidelines for 
the Development of Equivalence Agreements regarding Food Import and Export Inspection and 
Certification Systems, which were adopted in 1999. The work on guidance on the 
judgement of equivalence of technical measures has not progressed in the same 
way. The TBT Committee has not produced any decision on the subject and the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission furthermore decided in 2003 not to pursue this 
 
Equivalence and Mutual Recognition in Trade Arrangements 
Centre for Food Policy / Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 2004 
2
work. However, in principle there is no reason why equivalence assessments should 
not be just as relevant and important for technical measures as for SPS measures. 
Furthermore, some countries actually perform such assessments even today. 
Chapter 3 presents a number of trade arrangements involving mutual recog-
nition and equivalence assessments. Two main points should be highlighted from 
this empirical investigation. Firstly, examples from in particular the organic food 
sector show that assessment of equivalence is highly relevant with regard to techni-
cal regulations and standards. Secondly, there are many examples of mutual recog-
nition agreements involving assessments of the equivalence of different national 
conformity assessment procedures. However, before entering into such agreements 
there are a number of factors one should consider, e.g., the costs vs. the benefits, 
the ideal scope of the agreements, and the need to build capacity and trust in order 
to negotiate and maintain the agreements. Thus, the decision on whether 
equivalence assessments are feasible should be made on a case-to-case basis.  
In chapter 4 we present some critical points with regard to the application of 
mutual recognition and equivalence of technical measures. First, our investigation 
shows that it is easier to establish equivalence on conformity assessment than for 
rules. However, these two issues are strongly interrelated and it would thus be 
interesting to explore further situations where, in particular, the establishment of 
equivalence on rules is both relevant and feasible. Second, although equivalence 
assessments in the TBT area are more complicated and less clear-cut than in the 
SPS area, we basically see no reasons why such assessments cannot play an impor-
tant role. However, there are several factors that should be kept in mind, inter alia,  
the open-ended character of the TBT Agreement involving a large number of 
potential legitimate objectives,  
the problem of identifying legitimate objectives separate from the design of the 
technical measures themselves,  
the need to separate performance criteria from design and product characte-
ristics,  
and the need to sort out the relevance and importance of both private and 
governmental initiatives in providing relevant standards and guidelines. 
 
In chapter 5 we make some concluding remarks and address the implications of the 
factors mentioned above for further international guidance on equivalence assess-
ments on technical measures. We argue that many of the basic principles and argu-
ments that apply to the SPS area also apply to the TBT area. In both areas, factors 
such as cost-benefit considerations, confidence building, and information 
exchange, enter into the co-operative work as important conditions. Further, in 
both areas the difficult, but nevertheless feasible task is to specify two or more 
different measures and the regulatory objectives they are meant to fulfil, and on this 
basis evaluate the ´likenessµ of the measures. 
One important threshold for achieving equivalence is defining the regulatory 
objectives and based on these, setting the level (e.g., minimum protection level) that 
measures must reach. We argue that this exercise might be considered to be more 
complicated for TBT measures than for SPS measures. However, the argument can 
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also be turned around. Because TBT measures are not necessarily linked to essen-
tial requirements such as health protection, it may actually be easier to negotiate 
equivalence in many situations. In chapter 5 we also point to three ways of 
pursuing the work on international guidance for the application of mutual 
recognition and equivalence assessments in the food sector. First, there is a need 
for co-ordinated efforts by relevant international organizations, both private and 
intergovernmental, such as the WTO, Codex Alimentarius, ISO (International 
Standardization Organization) and IFOAM (International Federation of Organic 
Agriculture Movements). One element of these co-ordinating initiatives would be 
to evaluate already existing relevant guidelines, such as the ISO guide for arrange-
ments for the recognition and acceptance of conformity assessment results and the 
different Codex guidelines involving conformity assessment and equivalence. 
Second, there is a need for co-ordinated national initiatives. Experiences from the 
SPS area show that an important condition for being able to proceed with the work 
is that certain states take the lead and provide convincing information and argu-
ments (if these exist) in co-operation with other willing states, on the potential need 
for developing international guidance.  
Generally, there is a need for more information sharing and confidence- and 
capacity building at the international level in order for equivalence and mutual 
recognition to play en even more important role in food trade. Moreover, mutual 
recognition and equivalence are potentially important trade-facilitating tools, but 
they must nevertheless be studied and applied in combination with international 
harmonisation and standardization. 
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First, a crucial distinction between two parts of regulatory systems must be done. 
Regulatory systems generally consists of (Sykes 1995: 2²3): 
Rules of some kind which can be technical regulations, standards or guidelines 
against which a product or production process or method is judged 
Conformity assessment, which refers to the process through which products are 
evaluated for compliance with the rules. 
 
The important premise for the discussion on equivalence and mutual recognition as 
trade-facilitating tools is the fact that national regulatory systems, including 
regulations, standards and procedures for ensuring compliance with regulations and 
standards (cf. conformity assessment procedures), may cause impediments to world 
trade.1 Spencer Henson (2000) points to three ways in which different national 
regulatory systems can cause trade impediments: 
First of all they can lead to import restrictions or unreasonably high production 
costs for individual suppliers;  
Secondly, the requirements can have a discriminatory effect on various trade 
partners;  
                                           
 1 See for instance: Vogel (1995), Nicolaodis (1997), Pollack and Shaffer (2001), Trebilcock 
(2002). 
 
Equivalence and Mutual Recognition in Trade Arrangements 
Centre for Food Policy / Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 2004 
6
Thirdly, the total scope of the trade can be reduced due to higher prices or more 
stringent trade barriers for all potential suppliers.  
 
The design and operation of regulatory systems may thus cause unnecessarily high 
costs for traders and may reduce the volume of trade and thus function as serious 
trade barriers. In food trade, both food safety/health measures (e.g. maximum 
residue limits for pesticides and acceptable daily intake of food additives) and 
technical/quality measures (e.g. mandatory labelling and required trade 
descriptions) may create trade barriers. Differences between regulatory systems may 
exist as a result of variations in taste, technology, resources, income level, admini-
strative culture, risk assessment, societal goals or even by chance (Sykes 1995, 1999; 
Egan 1998). Some of the regulatory differences are clearly legitimate. Moreover, 
certain variations of regulations do not cause negative trade effects. However, 
national differences driven by protectionist capture, by bureaucratic indifferences 
or by information failures resulting in greater costs on foreign firms are true trade 
barriers (Sykes 1999).  
Trade problems caused by food regulations raise four important questions: First, 
what objectives are the (trade restrictive) regulatory measures designed to fulfil? 
Second, in what way can these objectives be said to be legitimate? Third, are the 
measures in place absolutely necessary in order to fulfil these objectives? Fourth, 
what tools can be used to facilitate trade and ensure fair practise in trade without 
compromising legitimate national regulatory objectives?  
In this report we shall examine how the concepts of equivalence and mutual 
recognition in food trade arrangements can contribute to reducing or eliminating 
undesired trade impacts caused by differences in national regulatory systems. We 
place special emphasis on how these tools are used with regard to technical mea-
sures, since previously this has been less explored than equivalence and mutual 
recognition with regard to food safety/health related measures. Moreover, studies 
of world food trade have shown that there are more trade barriers originating from 
the former than the latter (Gezelius et al. 2002). The concepts of equivalence and 
mutual recognition have been perceived and applied in many different ways. Thus, 
we wish to contribute to the much-needed clarification of these concepts. Our 
ambition is to identify situations where equivalence and mutual recognition have 
been perceived and applied as relevant trade-facilitating tools. Further, we aim at 
suggesting some of the conditions under which the different tools are more or less 
relevant. Hopefully, the results of our efforts may contribute to the discussion on 
the use of equivalence and mutual recognition in relevant international fora such as 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  
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Harmonization is probably the most well known trade-facilitating tool. The goal of 
harmonization is uniformity of trade measures on an international basis. However, 
full harmonization may not be achievable in practice or even not desirable for legi-
timate reasons like for instance differences such as perceived acceptable protection 
levels etc. Still, having the same product standard or regulation and the same con-
formity assessment procedures on a world ² wide basis can seem very intriguing. In 
theory it would remove the costs of adapting to multiple regulations and the 
trading conditions would be the same for all firms regardless of nationality. 
The WTO is placing great emphasis on the role of harmonization through the 
use of standards. Even though compliance with international standards is volun-
tary, standards may in practice be ascribed a certain semi-binding authority through 
the WTO2. This is due to the fact that WTO members, on the basis of the SPS 
Agreement (Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) 
and the TBT Agreement3 (Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade), are commit-
ted to participate in establishing new international standards and to base their 
national regulations on relevant international standards when such exists. In the 
lack of international standards, it is necessary to identify and compare variations be-
tween the national regulations, standards or procedures and to remove these 
differences on a bi- or multilateral basis. To harmonize national measures will then 
imply transforming two or more rules into one, the result being that two or more 
countries recognize, establish and apply the same regulatory measures. 
Further, governments are more frequently making references to standards in 
regulations instead of including detailed specifications and requirements of goods 
in legal texts. ´The New Approach to Product Regulationµ of the European Union 
has established the principle that community directives are limited to determine the 
essential requirements that products must meet to be placed on the market. Technical 
specifications of products, meeting these essential requirements, are laid down in 
standards established by (inter-) governmental or private standardization bodies. 
Following a standard automatically gives a presumption of conformity with the 
corresponding essential requirements (European Communities 2000). In the food 
sector, international harmonization can, e.g., be achieved through the elaboration 
of new standards through the food standardization body Codex Alimentarius 
Commission and by ensuring that the member states change their rules accordingly. 
As states adapt their regulatory systems to international standardized solutions, 
there will be reduced variation as to how food is produced, manufactured and 
controlled. Harmonization thus leads to a situation where states implement the 
same measures based on the same regulatory objectives.  
                                           
 2 See for example the WTO rulings in the dispute between the EU and Peru concerning trade 
description of sardines (WTO 2002i). The EU lost the case because it had not based its 
regulation on the relevant Codex standard. 
 3 See e.g. Article 2.4 and 2.6 of the TBT-agreement and Article 3 of the SPS-agreement. 
 
Equivalence and Mutual Recognition in Trade Arrangements 
Centre for Food Policy / Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 2004 
8
Against this background, the work of international standardization bodies have 
become of greater importance. The process of harmonization may, however, be 
quite time consuming, and full harmonization can thus be difficult to accomplish. 
In fact, some claim that harmonization is a rigid tool that does not respond well to 
changes. Hence, harmonization is not always necessary or the appropriate tool to 
use in many situations (Sykes 1999). Below, we shall elaborate on how equivalence 
and mutual recognition can be used as alternative trade facilitating techniques 
allowing for regulatory differences under certain conditions. Harmonization, 
equivalence and mutual recognition are not mutually exclusive, but complementary 
means of reducing trade barriers while at the same time achieving regulatory objec-
tives, such as consumer protection. 
Equivalence assessment and acceptance is an alternative way of facilitating trade. In 
fact, the equivalence concept is based on the fact that regulatory goals, e.g., in 
relation to health and food quality, in practice may be fulfilled by the use of 
different kinds of measures. For instance, Australia uses heat treatment of milk for 
the production of hard cheese to ensure food safety. Switzerland uses raw milk, 
however still attaining at least the same level of pathogen destruction as pasteuri-
sation through a special manufacturing process (WTO 2001a). New Zealand for 
instance accepts a µno riskµ² period of import of cucurbits from Australia during 
the winter as an alternative health-measure instead of requiring the use of chemicals 
as a treatment to avoid the spread of fruit flies (WTO 2001b). This implies that 
Australia has demonstrated that the method they apply for fulfilling the objectives 
for sanitary/phytosanitary measures are just as effective as the methods required by 
New Zealand. Then, New Zealand can accept the use of the alternative measure 
without undermining the objectives of the national regulation. An example in 
relation to technical measures is Japan·s acceptance of the U.S. standard for organic 
agricultural products as equivalent to the relevant Japanese standard, allowing 
products labelled in accordance with the U.S. standard on the Japanese market 
(WTO 2002, see also case description in chapter 3 of this report). In other words, 
Japan considers the U.S. standard and labelling practices to be ensuring the interest 
of the consumers in a way just as effective as its own standard and practices. These 
examples illustrate that equivalence recognition can lead to the same results as 
harmonization; trade barriers are removed and the products can be accepted on the 
basis that they fulfil the relevant regulatory objectives ² even though regulatory 
differences persist. Agreements involving equivalence assessments make it possible 
to maintain distinct national regulatory measures while at the same time removing the measures· 
trade restrictive effects. 
A third way of facilitating trade is to accept regulatory differences by way of mutual 
recognition, which is a tool that can be conceived and applied in different ways. 
Mutual recognition can simply mean that two or more parties mutually accept 
each other·s rules. Such acceptance is used in situations where differences in 
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national regulatory measures and objectives are considered to be of no such nature 
as to allow for trade restrictions. A classic example of this conception of mutual 
recognition is the so-called ´Cassis de Dijon doctrineµ (see Box 1) of the European 
Union, which implies that a product lawfully produced in one member state must 
be accepted into another member state. According to this doctrine national food 
legislation cannot be invoked to prevent trade unless necessary for reasons of 
public health, fiscal supervision or consumer protection. Mutual recognition in this 
sense means that producers that comply with the regulatory requirements of an exporting country, 
automatically should be allowed into an importing country. 
 
BOX 1: Mutual recognition in the EU: The ´Cassis de DiMonµ case 
In the ´Cassis de Dijonµ case, the European Court of Justice struck down a 
German import prohibition, which banned the import, sale and/or marketing of 
liqueurs that didn't meet minimum German alcohol standards. The case involved a 
French liqueur (´Cassis de Dijonµ) manufactured from black currants. Cassis con-
tains 15%²20% alcohol and the German standards prescribed 25%. The European 
Court of Justice ruled that because Cassis met French standards, it could not be 
kept out of the German market. The European Court rejected the German health 
argument as unconvincing and dismissed its consumer protection justification. The 
´Cassis de Dijon doctrineµ was further confirmed by the European Union·s ¶new 
approach· to standardization, adopted in 1985 (see European Commission 2000 
and BOX 2 in this report). 
 
A second conception of mutual recognition is linked to so-called Mutual Recognition 
Agreements (MRAs) on conformity assessment procedures. The mutual recognition 
aspect means that the involved parties mutually accept each other·s conformity assessment 
procedures as equivalent in order to ensure compliance with prevailing regulatory 
requirements. Normally, an MRA is a voluntary agreement between governmental 
conformity assessment bodies. Certification bodies in two countries may, inter alia, 
accept each others certification as equivalent. Agreements between non-govern-
mental agencies are usually called Mutual Recognition Arrangements. MRAs could 
for instance enable a supplier to submit a test report from the accepted laboratory 
in its home country to obtain certification in another country without a repetition 
of costly testing. Different accreditation bodies may also accept each others 
systems, competence and results as equivalent and establish agreements on mutual 
recognition. Then, a certification body could for instance use its assessment report 
supplied by the accreditation body in the home country for attaining accreditation 
in another country without repetition of a full on-site assessment (ISO Bulletin, 
October 2002)4.  
                                           
 4 The International Accreditation Forum (IAF) is the world association on conformity 
assessment accreditation bodies in the fields of products, services, management services, 
personnel and other programmes of conformity assessment. One of the main goals of IAF is 
to develop a single worldwide program for conformity assessment assuring that accreditation 
 
Equivalence and Mutual Recognition in Trade Arrangements 
Centre for Food Policy / Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 2004 
10 
MRAs do not presuppose harmonization or recognition of equivalence of 
regulations or standards (Nicolaodis 1997). Hence, the exporting country checks 
conformity according to the rules or standards of the importing country. Products can 
then be approved before export in the country of production reducing or elimina-
ting the need to check conformity with the rules of the importing country again at 
arrival. In such cases, companies must still bear the costs of producing their goods 
in accordance with both the product requirements of their national market and 
other sets of requirements for exports. However, they have the benefits of a ´one 
stopµ control removing duplicated inspections and fees and reducing the time for 
the product to reach the market.  
It is important to be aware that, in practice, MRAs can involve a mix of several 
elements. MRAs can include, e.g., equivalence judgement and acceptance in relation 
to conformity assessment procedures, the acceptance of certain differences in both 
procedures and objectives of national regulatory systems without any equivalence 
assessment involved (mutual recognition in the ´Cassis de Dijonµ version of the 
concept), as well as elements of compliance, for instance procedures to ensure 
compliance with the other states· rules.  
MRAs on conformity assessment also provides for a more efficient system with 
better division of labour between countries and between public and private control 
bodies helping to spread the cost of assuring compliance (Merill 1998). However, 
the most favourable solution would be to produce the goods in accordance with 
only one set of product requirements (regulations and standards are either harmo-
nized or recognized as equivalent) as well as getting the products tested and 
declared just once (agreements on mutual recognition of conformity assessment). 
Thus, harmonization, equivalence and mutual recognition of conformity assess-
ment are often interlinked in trade facilitating agreements. 
The WTO agreements on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS Agreement) 
and technical barriers to trade (TBT Agreement) both explicitly address the 
problem of trade restricting regulatory measures (regulations, standards and con-
formity assessment procedures, see definitions below). Further, both agreements 
encourage international harmonization of food standards and the use of equiva-
lence to facilitate trade. In addition, provisions of the TBT Agreement include the 
use of mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures (cf. Article 6).  
The SPS Agreement covers regulatory measures designed to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health from risks arising from the entry, establishment or 
spread of pests, and diseases. The term conformity assessment is not used in the 
agreement, but SPS measures include control, inspection and approval procedures 
and thus also cover conformity assessment procedures (Annex A (1) and Annex C 
                                                                                                                                    
can be relied upon across boarders. Within Europe, the parallel body to IAF is The European 
Cooperation for Accreditation - EEA. 
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of the SPS Agreement). The SPS Agreement sets out different criteria for the use 
of health/sanitary protective regulations (e.g., requirements regarding scientific evidence, 
risk assessments, appropriate level of protection) to ensure that the least trade restric-
tive measures are applied. The TBT Agreement covers technical regulations, stan-
dards and conformity assessment procedures. Technical regulations means mandatory 
requirements, other than regulations defined as sanitary measures, in relation to 
product characteristics, processes and methods (Annex I of the TBT agreement)5. 
A main purpose of the TBT Agreement is to ensure that technical regulations do 
not create unnecessary trade barriers.  
Technical regulations include requirements regarding quality, marking or label-
ling, trade descriptions, packaging, terminology etc. In contrast to regulations, 
technical standards are non-mandatory rules, guidelines or characteristics for products 
or related processes and production methods that provides for common and 
repeated use. Standards are producing uniformity by establishing general product or 
product related requirements. Annex 3 of The TBT Agreement is a code of good 
practice for the preparation, adoption and application of standards open to accep-
tance by any standardization organization. Conformity assessment procedures are any 
procedure aimed to determine that relevant requirements in technical regulations or 
standards are fulfilled6. Some examples are inspections, testing and sampling, certi-
fication, management system assessment and registration, process evaluation, and 
accreditation of the competence of those activities and recognition of an accredi-
tation program·s capability. Food control and inspection is thus one way of per-
forming conformity assessment.  
Certification and accreditation are activities closely related to conformity assess-
ment. Certification involves providing consumers assurance that, e.g., a company 
produces its products in accordance with the requirements of specific standards or regulations. 
Certification is thus a formal acceptance of this company's ability to ensure con-
formity. The certification process often includes comprehensive and repeated 
evaluations of documentation combined with on-site audits. Certified companies 
may be granted the right to use specific labels on their products to communicate to 
the consumer that their products conform to the relevant standard or rule. The 
bodies performing certification must be accredited, meaning that the body is 
recognized as competent to perform tasks related to conformity assessment, e.g., testing, 
calibration or certification.  
Both the SPS Committee and the TBT Committee have addressed how the con-
cepts of equivalence and mutual recognition can be applied to facilitate trade in 
relation to regulations, standards and conformity assessment procedures. However, 
these concepts also play a key role in conjunction with Codex Alimentarius norms, 
in assisting the most efficient and effective application of both sanitary and techni-
cal food standards (Gascoine 1999). Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) was 
created in 1963 by FAO and WHO, to develop food standards, guidelines and 
                                           
 5 See point 2.4 for a discussion on SPS vs. TBT- measures. 
 6 See e.g. descriptions of the concept of conformity assessment on the websites of the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO): http://www.iso.ch and the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI): http://www.ansi.org 
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related texts. Today CAC, with over 170 members, has become the seminal global 
reference point for consumers, food producers and processors, national food 
control agencies and international food trade. The main purposes of CAC are 
protecting consumer health and ensuring fair practices in food trade and promoting 
coordination of all food standards work undertaken by international governmental 
and non-governmental organizations.7  
CAC is responsible for developing standards, recommendations, guidelines, etc. 
These are relevant for both sanitary measures (SPS) and technical measures (TBT) 
and thus important in facilitating food trade. CAC is also important for developing 
guidance for conformity assessment through its work on food import and export 
inspection and certification systems. However, with regard to conformity assess-
ment, the standards and manuals elaborated by other organizations, e.g. the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Laboratory 
Accreditation Co-operation (ILAC) and the International Accreditation Forum 
(IAF) are also important. ISO is a non-governmental body having a complementary 
role to Codex and other governmental standardizations bodies. The ISO standards 
do not prescribe actual product requirements like Codex standards do. ISO stan-
dards describes how to implement and comply with product requirements for 
instance in terms of methods for testing and analysing, resulting in harmonization 
of conformity assessment procedures.  
Over the past years, CAC has increasingly focused its work on sanitary measures, 
i.e. food safety and hazard related standards. However, work on technical stan-
dards, including quality requirements and elements of conformity assessment 
systems, is still part of the mandate (cf. ensuring fair practise in trade). Moreover, 
technical standards still play an import role in both national food regulations and as 
impediments to world trade. CAC elaborates standards related to technical regula-
tions under both horizontal committees (e.g., Codex Committee on Food 
Labelling) and vertical/commodity committees (e.g., Codex Committee on Fish 
and Fishery Products). The work in Codex Committee on Food Import and Export 
Inspection and Certification Systems is of special relevance for conformity assess-
ment with regard to food standards. 
In the preparations for the report we conducted interviews with persons that have 
been involved in the work on equivalence and mutual recognition in addition to 
performing a comprehensive document and literature review. We also made exten-
sive searches for information on the Internet. Still, the report suffers from a lack of 
comprehensive documentation regarding the presented examples of the use of 
mutual recognition and equivalence. We utilized the limited available empirical data 
as much as we could. In an ´ideal worldµ much more documentation would have 
been provided. Thus, the report does not contain an in-depth analysis of the inclu-
ded cases, but merely descriptive presentations. However, we think that the report 
                                           
 7 Cf. Article 1 of the Statutes of CAC: http://www.codexalimentarius.net/  
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provides an overview of the field and that it may be a useful input for further 
discussions and investigations. 
8
The report is structured as follows: In chapter 2 we present the work on mutual 
recognition and equivalence in the WTO and the CAC. We furthermore also touch 
upon other international organizations· work on these issues in. In chapter 3 we 
present actual examples of the use of equivalence and mutual recognition as trade-
facilitating tools with regard to technical measures and conformity assessment 
procedures. First, we present examples from the food sector. Then, we present 
examples from other sectors that may be interesting and relevant for the food 
sector. In chapter 4, we pinpoint some critical issues and pose some central 
questions with regard to the process of reaching agreement on equivalence and 
mutual recognition. In chapter 5, we ask how relevant equivalence and mutual 
recognition are as trade-facilitating tools in a TBT context. Finally, we present 
some considerations and recommendations in relation to pursuing the work on 
international guidance on these issues.  
                                           
 8 This report is a continuation of the work that was initiated and presented in NILF Working 
Paper 2002-36: µEquivalence and Mutual Recognition Agreements in Relation to Technical 
Measuresµ. 
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In this chapter we investigate how the concepts of equivalence and mutual recogni-
tion are perceived and applied in the WTO, the CAC and other international 
organizations handling food-related issues. The purpose is to analyse the role of 
these trade-facilitating tools in world trade today. Moreover, we consider the poten-
tial for developing further international guidance, e.g. in a TBT and Codex context, 
on how these tools can be applied in practise in co-operative arrangements between 
national regulatory systems. 
The SPS and TBT Agreements of the WTO are the most relevant agreements with 
regard to the use of equivalence and mutual recognition in facilitating food trade. 
The SPS Agreement covers sanitary measures and associated food control and 
inspection systems; the TBT Agreement covers technical measures, standards and 
conformity assessment. 
Specifications for the use of equivalence are laid down in Article 4 of The SPS 
Agreement: 
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1. Members shall accept the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of other Members as equiva-
lent, even if these measures differ from their own or from those used by other Members 
trading in the same product, if the exporting Member objectively demonstrates to the 
importing Member that its measures achieve the importing Member's appropriate level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection. For this purpose, reasonable access shall be given, upon 
request, to the importing Member for inspection, testing and other relevant procedures. 
 
2. Members shall, upon request, enter into consultations with the aim of achieving bilateral 
and multilateral agreements on recognition of the equivalence of specified sanitary or phyto-
sanitary measures.  
 
Measures aimed to protect health must be scientifically justified based on a risk 
assessment defining a corresponding ´Appropriate Level of Protection ² ALOPµ. 
The main provision on equivalence in the SPS Agreement, Article 4.1, opens for 
accepting different ways of achieving a defined protection level ² ALOP. Paragraph 
2 of the article also encourages members to enter into equivalence agreements. 
Mutual recognition or MRAs are not mentioned in the SPS Agreement. 
The TBT Agreement includes both the concept of equivalence and mutual 
recognition. The main provisions on equivalence in the TBT Agreement are Article 
2.7 on technical regulations and Article 6.1 on conformity assessment procedures: 
 
2.7 Members shall give positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations 
of other Members, even if these regulations differ from their own, provided they are satisfied 
that these regulations adequately fulfil the objectives of their own regulations. 
 
6.1  Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 4, Members shall ensure, 
whenever possible, that results of conformity assessment procedures in other Members are 
accepted, even when those procedures differ from their own, provided they are satisfied that 
those procedures offer an assurance of conformity with applicable technical regulations or 
standards equivalent to their own procedures. It is recognized that prior consultations may be 
necessary in order to arrive at a mutually satisfactory understanding regarding, in particular:  
 
Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement is less specific than Article 4 of the SPS Agree-
ment as to the legitimate objectives technical regulations can fulfil, reflecting the 
more ´open-endedµ character of the TBT Agreement. While SPS measures are 
adopted for health protection objectives only, TBT measures may fulfil a wide 
range of legitimate objectives, e.g., national security requirements, the prevention of 
deceptive practices, protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or 
health, or environmental protection (Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement). Thus, the 
goal of the technical regulation must be (made) explicit before assessing whether 
the different means used to achieve this specific goal can be accepted as equivalent. 
Article 6.1 is quite specific as to the application of equivalence in relation to 
conformity assessment. Moreover, the agreement goes more into detail on the rele-
vance of equivalence for conformity assessment procedures than for technical regu-
lations. Establishing equivalence of conformity assessment procedures simply 
means accepting that different procedures can be used for compliance checks 
achieving the same level of conformity assurance. Article 6.3 encourages the 
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members to enter into agreements on mutual recognition of conformity assessment 
procedures (MRAs): 
 
6.3 Members are encouraged, at the request of other Members, to be willing to enter into 
negotiations for the conclusion of agreements for the mutual recognition of results of each 
other's conformity assessment procedures. Members may require that such agreements fulfil 
the criteria of paragraph 1 and give mutual satisfaction regarding their potential for facilitating 
trade in the products concerned. 
 
The different nature of SPS and TBT measures may have implications for the 
application of equivalence and mutual recognition as trade-facilitating tools. 
In the food sector, sanitary measures are linked to the goal of ensuring food 
safety and reducing food hazards and risks. The key question is whether the mea-
sures are safe or not in order to achieve a given level of health protection. As men-
tioned above, equivalence assessment is then aimed at determining whether two 
different SPS measures are both capable of achieving the same level of protection.  
In contrast, TBT measures can be adopted for various reasons making it harder 
to find comparable rules. Technical measures can be based on everything from cul-
ture and religion (such as rules for halal meat and kosher food) to historic traditions 
and regional interests (such as different criteria for using the trade description 
´Sardineµ). Further, descriptive characteristics of technical measures are often 
intertwined with the objective itself or the objectives are not specified. In addition, 
it seems to be difficult to find the criteria for comparing TBT measures with regard 
to equivalence. While SPS measures have to be scientifically justified and based on 
risk assessment, there are no such conditions for introducing TBT measures. 
Consequently, there is no parallel to the SPS criteria of appropriate level of 
protection (ALOP). Assessment of equivalence for technical measures thus 
involves potentially a more complicated process of identifying both legitimate 
objectives and parameters that can be used for comparison. Against this back-
ground, it may at first sight seem harder to grasp the potential for equivalence 
recognition in the TBT area than in the SPS area. 
However, the concept of mutual recognition of equivalence of conformity 
assessment is clearly relevant for both sanitary/phytosanitary and technical mea-
sures. The key question for determining equivalency of conformity assessment 
systems is whether these systems have the capacity to ensure compliance with a 
given set of requirements.  
Mutual recognition, in the meaning of automatic acceptance of a product pro-
duced under foreign rules to enter the market, would also be just as relevant for 
SPS measures as for TBT measures. 
Equivalence has been a subject of attention in the SPS Committee for several years. 
Naturally, the work of the SPS Committee has been focusing on the implemen-
tation of Article 4 ² the equivalence provision of the SPS agreement. The experi-
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ences of the member states with regard to equivalence recognition have been 
important for the discussions, including a special focus on the views of developing 
countries. 
In July 2001, the General Council of the WTO requested the SPS Committee to 
prepare specific recommendations for the implementation of Article 4 of the SPS 
Agreement. A decision on this issue was adopted in October 2001 (WTO 2001a). 
In recent years, several revisions and additions have been made to this Decision 
(WTO 2002e, 2003l, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c). In this section, we will present the main 
elements of the SPS Committee·s decisions on the implementation of Article 4. To 
illustrate, we will present some of the notifications made by member states on their 
experiences with equivalence recognition. Finally, the link between the SPS 
Committee and other international organizations will be addressed. 
An important element in the SPS Committee's Decision on the implementation 
of Article 4, is the clarification on the different roles of the importing vs. the exporting 
country in relation to equivalence recognition. The Decision states that the importing 
country is responsible for explaining the objective and rationale of the sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure. Further, the importing country should identify the 
associated risk, provide for a copy of the risk assessment and indicate the appro-
priate level of protection that the measure is designed to achieve. In general, the 
importing country should provide the information necessary to aid the exporting 
country in demonstrating equivalence of their measures. The Decision also states 
that the importing country shall respond in a timely manner to any requests on 
equivalence recognition from exporting countries, normally within a six-month 
period. The exporting country has the burden of demonstrating that the measure 
satisfies the protection level of the importing country through scientific and 
technical documentation. However, the importing country should be given access 
to inspection or testing in relation to the equivalence assessment.  
The SPS Committee adopted a specific working programme on further imple-
mentation of Article 4 on equivalence in March 2002 (WTO 2002d). This 
programme was completed in March 2004. Through this work, further clarification 
of the Decision on equivalence made in 2001 has been reached on several issues also 
related to the equivalence assessment process. Further clarifications have been made in 
relation to the aspects of ´accelerated procedureµ and ´historic tradeµ (paragraph 5 
of the Decision), ´trade disruptionµ (paragraph 6) and ´comparison of protection 
levelsµ (paragraph 7). The issues of accelerated procedure and historic trade con-
cerns the possibilities for speeding up the equivalence assessment process based on 
familiarity and confidence between the parties due to trade relations prior to the 
equivalence assessment. Argentina, New Zealand and Australia were engaged in 
this debate with special submissions (WTO 2002e, 2002f, 2002g). The Committee 
states that available information and experience, if directly relevant to products or 
measures under consideration, should be taken into account in recognition of 
equivalence of measures proposed by the exporting country.  
The Committee also specifies the relevant information and experience to be 
considered: historic knowledge of the competent authorities in the exporting 
country, available evaluation and recognition of product related systems of inspec-
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tion and certification, available scientific information and relevant information con-
cerning SPS measures of other products when useful. The importing country 
should also consider the risk of the product in order to accelerate the procedure in 
cases of low risk. Information already available should not be sought again. The 
Decision also underlines that for accelerated procedures, the importing country 
should draw up a schedule of the necessary steps and timeframes for the equiva-
lence assessment process in order to provide predictability (WTO 2004b). 
In relation to the issue of ´disruption of tradeµ, the Decision of the Committee 
makes clear that requests for equivalence recognition shall not in itself be a reason 
to disrupt or suspend on-going imports from the requesting country. The SPS 
Committee actually underlines that such an act would be in apparent violation of 
the obligations under Article 2 of the SPS Agreement. However, recognition of 
equivalence does not impede on the right of an importing country to implement 
necessary SPS measures even if this should coincide with requests for equivalence 
recognition. To avoid any misinterpreted linkage of issues, the Committee recom-
mends that the importing country should give an immediate and comprehensive 
explanation of the reason for its actions in restricting trade to the affected party. 
The ability of SPS measures to fulfil the appropriate level of protection, ALOP, 
is an essential point of equivalence assessment that members seem to find difficult 
in practice. Australia and Argentina (WTO 2002g, 2002h) gave special submissions 
on this item. The main issues in the discussion were that it could be difficult for the 
exporting country to demonstrate that the alternative SPS measure satisfies the 
ALOP of the importing country. This would be the case when the importing 
countries have failed to define their ALOP precisely or the ALOP is not explicit at 
all. In these situations there is a need for an objective basis for comparison. The 
SPS Committee has developed special ´Guidelines to Further the Practical 
Implementation of Article 5.5µ of the SPS Agreement that may assist members in 
judging equivalence with regard to ALOP (WTO 2000b). 
In October 2000, the General Council of the WTO requested the SPS 
Committee to examine the concerns of developing countries regarding equivalence 
of SPS measures and to come up with concrete options on how to deal with them. 
Some of the developing countries have faced difficulties when trying to get their 
alternative SPS measures accepted. Some developing countries furthermore seem 
to perceive the requirements of the developed countries more as demands for 
´samenessµ of measures instead of acceptance of alternative measures. The 
Decision of the Committee on this issue recognizes the importance of transpa-
rency, exchange of information and confidence building to achieve agreement on 
equivalence. The Committee calls the attention to Article 9 of the SPS Agreement, 
which states that developing countries shall receive technical assistance to facilitate 
the implementation of Article 4 on equivalence. The Decision points out that such 
assistance may involve helping an exporting country to identify and implement 
measures which can be recognized as equivalent or to otherwise enhance market 
access opportunities. 
Several member countries have reported on their practical experiences with 
equivalence to the SPS Committee, among them Australia, New Zealand, United 
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States, EU, Japan, Indonesia, Fiji, Thailand and Chile. However, some of the notifi-
cations give little information about both the alternative SPS measure in question 
and about experiences from the equivalence assessment process. Several of the 
notifications mention equivalence acceptance in relation to one specific product, 
e.g., acceptance of alternative health measures in the manufacturing process of 
cheese or different kinds of alternative treatment of fruit and vegetables to avoid 
spread of disease. The notifications of the United States and the EU stand out as 
two of the most comprehensive inputs to the SPS Committee. Below, we shall brie-
fly present the main elements of these notifications. 
The U.S. government informed the SPS Committee that it has established 
several sets of criteria for equivalence assessment of food regulatory systems of 
other countries. Special criteria for assessment of equivalence in relation to meat 
and poultry regulations are established. All countries wanting to export meat or 
poultry to the United States must first undergo an equivalence assessment. 
However, the situation for meat and poultry is special, since 85% of all food 
imports to the United States must not be subjected to any equivalence assessment. 
The assessment consists of a questionnaire, review of documents and an on-site 
audit of the inspection system of the exporting country. If equivalence is esta-
blished, the country is placed on a list of approved exporters. Thus, this system 
does not include any formal agreements. In 2000, 36 countries had achieved equi-
valence recognition of their control and inspection systems for meat and poultry.  
Criteria for equivalence assessment in relation to seafood and HACCP control 
systems (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point) are also in place. Among 
other elements, the United States reports that in their experience, equivalence 
determination requires a significant investment of technical and trade experts to 
address and resolve safety issues. Even in situations where ALOPs and govern-
mental institutions may appear to be similar, determination of equivalence has 
taken several years to establish. The United States pinpoints various practical 
challenges that should be kept in mind when implementing the concept of equiva-
lence, e.g., the need to consider whether the potential trade benefits can justify the 
administrative burden of making a determination of equivalence.  
The EU also informs of several practical examples of implementations of the 
concept of equivalence, making their system of equivalence recognition in relation 
to seafood inspection and certification systems a case in point. Third-country 
regulations on fish and fish products must at least be equivalent to EU regulations. 
Equivalence in relation to health certificates is of special importance. In 2002, the 
seafood control and inspections systems of 62 countries had been recognized as 
equivalent. These countries are included in a list of approved fish exporters to the 
EU. An important advantage for the approved exporting countries is reduced 
number of inspections at the border. The EU reports that inspections have been 
reduced from 100% to 50% or 20% for certain products depending on the 
associated risk. Thus, the EU points out that equivalent levels of inspection and 
certification systems, e.g. for fishery products, lead to facilitation of trade. 
The SPS Committee has established co-operation with Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, OIE (The Office International des Epizooties) and the ICPM (The 
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Interim Commission on Phytosanitary Measures)9 with regard to equivalence 
issues. Member states are encouraged to participate in these standardization bodies 
and Codex, OIE and ICPM are invited to inform the SPS Committee about their 
activity on equivalence. The SPS Committee frequently refers to the ongoing work 
of these organizations or make reference to established standards and guidelines in 
relation to equivalence. In fact, the SPS Committee formally encouraged Codex to 
finalize their guidelines on the judgement of equivalence. The Committee also 
encourages OIE and ICPM to elaborate guidelines on equivalence recognition in 
relation to animal and plant health measures. In addition, the SPS Committee also 
requests these bodies to take into account the clarifications made by the Committee 
with regard to equivalence in their work. 
To sum up, the impression is that the SPS Committee has carried out an exten-
sive amount of work in relation to equivalence. Important clarifications have been 
made with regard to implementation of the equivalence provisions of the agree-
ment. In addition, the opinions and experiences of the member states with regard 
to the practical use of equivalence have to a certain extent been mapped. A rather 
close contact has been established with the international standardization bodies 
Codex, OIE and ICPM. For instance, the SPS Committee has recognized the 
urgency for Codex to develop guidance on the judgement of equivalence. 
The SPS Committee has no further working programme on equivalence, but it is 
decided that equivalence will be a standing agenda item for regular meetings in the 
SPS Committee. 
The TBT Committee has repeatedly drawn attention towards the need to address 
the issues of equivalence, mutual recognition and MRAs under the TBT Agree-
ment, including also the issue of mutual recognition of conformity assessment 
procedures (WTO 1997a, 2000a).  
During the First Triennial Review of the TBT Agreement, the Members were 
invited to exchange views on how the concept of equivalence might apply in 
relation to voluntary standards and on their experience in the implementation of 
Article 2.7 relating to equivalence of technical regulations (WTO 1997a: 6). Further, 
the Committee recognized the emerging interest in concluding MRAs and the 
possible difficulties and problems associated with these, in particular for developing 
country Members (WTO 1997a: 10). The problems included those relating to cost, 
transparency, non-MFN nature,10 opportunity to enter into negotiations for the 
                                           
 9 OIE (or the World Organisation for Animal Health) is an intergovernmental organisation 
created by the International Agreement of 25 January 1924, signed by 28 countries. In March 
2004, the OIE totalled 167 Member Countries. The ICPM governs the implementation of the 
U.N. International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC), which is an international treaty 
relating to plant health, to which 127 governments (as of 26 February 2004) currently adhere. 
ICPM is presently composed of representatives from both contracting parties to the IPPC and 
FAO members. The commission meets annually and provides a forum for the discussion of 
international plant protection issues and sets the annual programme of work. 
 10 MFN: Most-Favoured Nation Principle. 
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conclusion of MRAs, the need to take into account the quality of the conformity 
assessment procedures rather than the origin of the product, and efficiency and 
effectiveness of MRAs to solve problems of multiple testing and conformity 
assessment procedures (ibid.). Hence, the member countries have been requested 
to notify MRAs. By early 2003, the Committee had received 44 such notifications. 
Several of the Member·s submissions made to the First Triennial Review dis-
cussed the issue of mutual recognition and ² explicitly or implicitly ² the concept 
of equivalence. New Zealand submitted a communication in 1997 titled ´Require-
ments of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Concerning the 
Preparation, Adoption and Review of Technical Regulationµ (WTO 1997c). In 
New Zealand·s view, harmonization and recognition of equivalence are desirable 
where similar circumstances in each country make this a viable option. New 
Zealand thus sees equivalence and mutual recognition as potential viable options to 
pursue in order to reduce the problem of technical trade barriers but also recog-
nizes the problems related to differences in national regulatory systems. 
In 1997, Canada requested the First Triennial Review to ´...consider mutual 
recognition of test results and conformity assessment proceduresµ and added that, 
´...this discussion should include mutual recognition issues with respect to both 
international and national technical regulations and standardsµ (WTO 1997b: 5). 
Canada also stressed the usefulness of having a discussion among the Members 
regarding ´...their experience in negotiating MRAs with a view to develop draft 
guidelines for mutual recognition agreementsµ (ibid.).  
In 1998, ISO submitted a Communication to the TBT Committee notifying that 
draft guidelines on MRAs were under development (WTO 1998a). This work was 
concluded in 2002, and in a submission to the TBT Committee in 2003, ISO 
announced the completion of ISO/IEC Guide 68:2002: ´Arrangements for the 
recognition and acceptance of conformity assessment resultsµ (WTO 2003e). The 
ISO Guidelines are meant to provide ´...an introduction to the development, 
issuance and operation of arrangements for the recognition and acceptance of 
results produced by bodies undertaking similar conformity assessment and related 
activitiesµ (WTO 2003e: 1). 
In 1999, the WTO Secretariat prepared a stocktaking paper of the submissions 
by delegations on elements related to the Work Programme of the First Triennial 
Review, including the issues of equivalence and mutual recognition (WTO 1999). 
For example, Colombia had showed an interest to ´...study and develop the areas 
of mutual recognition and equivalence with respect to eco-labellingµ (WTO 1999: 
3). In Columbia·s opinion the application of the two concepts could solve some of 
the problems raised with regard to such schemes. Canada had provided several 
examples of technical regulations where it had referenced, or considered as equiva-
lent, the technical regulations of other Members. The examples included considera-
tion of data and testing methods as equivalent to Canadian data and testing 
methods, regulations which are considered obsolescent in relation to United States 
performance standards, and/or international standards and the use of technical 
regulations from other countries (WTO 1998c). Thailand had pointed out that the 
acceptance as equivalent of technical regulations of other members is provided in 
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the Industrial Product Standards Act of Thailand (WTO 1999: 5). However, 
because establishment of equivalence is proven difficult, Thailand prefers that 
equivalence would be best resolved with the adoption of international standards. If 
nothing else, the paper from the Secretariat showed the relevance of recognition of 
equivalence in a TBT context. 
During the Second Triennial Review, the TBT Committee reiterated the impor-
tance of Members notifying MRAs (WTO 2000a: 8). Moreover, the Committee 
´reiterated the importance of giving positive consideration to accepting as 
equivalent technical regulations of other Members as provided for under Article 
2.7µ (WTO 2000a: 9). A reference was also made to equivalence assessments in 
arrangements involving accreditation bodies and their activities. However, the 
Committee stated that there already exist international standards and guides for 
such arrangements.  
The TBT Committee further mentioned the possibility of unilaterally recogni-
zing the results of foreign conformity assessment procedures and the relevance of 
Article 6.1 of the TBT Agreement in this respect (WTO 2000a: 27). In the absence 
of accreditation, the conformity assessment body may prove its competence by 
other means. One such mean is to unilaterally recognize as equivalent the compe-
tence of the conformity assessment body, foreign test reports and certificates. It is 
also worthwhile mentioning that the TBT Committee has emphasised that equiva-
lence with regard to standards should only be applied when no international 
standard exists, and then only as an interim measure until suitable international 
standards are made available.  
New Zealand has on several occasions stated that equivalence of standards has 
merit as a means of avoiding and further reducing unnecessary obstacles to trade 
and that arrangements for recognition of equivalence can provide a useful starting-
point for agreement on content of future international standards (WTO 1998b, 
2000c). New Zealand has also provided examples of how it has implemented its 
obligations under Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement (WTO 1998c). One striking 
example is the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA) where 
the key principle is that a good, which can be legally sold in one country, may be 
legally sold in the other, without having to meet further sales-related regulatory 
requirement. The agreement means that differing Australian requirements relating 
to sale are recognized as equivalent to meet New Zealand·s objectives and vice-
versa. We will come back to this arrangement later in the report. New Zealand also 
mentions bilateral MRAs and referencing to other countries· national standards in 
New Zealand·s regulations, as ways to facilitate trade under the TBT Agreement. 
New Zealand has noted that even though Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement 
addresses the issue of equivalence for technical regulations, no similar wording 
exists in the text referring to voluntary standards (i.e. Annex 3: Code of Good 
Practise). Consequently, in 1998 New Zealand proposed an inclusion in the Code 
of Good Practise of an additional paragraph that more or less would reflect the 
wording on equivalence in Article 2.7 (WTO 1998b). In the process leading up to 
the completion of the Second Triennial Review, New Zealand submitted a docu-
ment containing a clarification of its position on recognition of equivalence (WTO 
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2000c). Here the proposal on changing the text of the TBT Agreement was with-
drawn and replaced by a proposal on including a text on equivalence of standards 
in the TBT Committee report to the General Council of the WTO. Thus, in the 
Annual Report of the TBT Committee for 2000 the following text was included 
(WTO 2000d): 
 
As an interim measure until suitable international standards were developed, the Committee 
noted that in some cases standardizing bodies or regulators in the territories of some Members 
had chosen to accept as equivalent standards originating from other Members, even though 
these standards differed from their own, on the basis that such standards fulfilled their objec-
tives. The Committee considered that Members may find it useful to further explore equiva-
lency of standards as an interim measure to facilitate trade in the absence of relevant interna-
tional standards.  
 
The TBT Committee further reiterated the importance of giving positive con-
sideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations of other Members as 
provided for under Article 2.7. 
In 2001, Canada made a contribution to the TBT Committee concerning the 
application of mutual recognition (WTO 2001). In the document ´A Policy Frame-
work for Mutual Recognition Activityµ Canada elaborated on its experience and 
policy framework related to mutual recognition activities in non-sanitary/phyto-
sanitary product sectors. 
In a contribution to the Second Triennial Review, Canada elaborated on the 
application of MRAs to which Canada has become a Party involving conformity 
assessment (WTO 2000b). Canada has entered into these arrangements with the 
purpose of eliminating duplicative testing and certification requirements, and thus 
reducing the burden on industry and regulatory agencies, thereby facilitating trade. 
Canada·s MRAs cover specific sectors and include recognition of inspection results, 
test reports and/or conformity certificates issued by bodies located in the territory 
of the exporting party (or parties), but deemed capable of testing to the importing 
party·s regulatory requirements. An equivalence assessment of different conformity 
assessment procedures is thus included in MRAs. In Canada·s opinion, negotiation 
of MRAs can be a labour intensive exercise and there is therefore a need for clear 
criteria for undertaking MRA negotiations to ensure that these reflect economic 
and stakeholder interests. Canada further has an emerging preference for single 
sector MRAs over the multi-sector framework model because these are easier to 
negotiate and implement. In addition, they tend to avoid the heavy bureaucratic 
structure associated with multi-sector MRAs. Canada further stressed that MRAs 
may not be appropriate to every situation. 
The work on the Second Triennial Review shows that the TBT Committee 
recognizes the importance of both MRAs and the recognition of equivalence for 
technical standards and regulations. Further, some countries, such as New Zealand, 
Canada and the EC, as will be further illustrated) have shown a particular interest in 
pursuing the work on mutual recognition and equivalence in the context of the 
TBT Committee. 
In 2002, the European Commission issued a Communication to the TBT 
Committee titled ´A Policy Framework for the Facilitation of Trade in the Fields of 
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Standardization and Conformity Assessment: A Toolbox of Instrumentsµ (WTO 
2002b). The document presented experiences of the European Commission in 
trade facilitation in the area of technical regulation, conformity assessment and 
certification. In addition, the document included an analysis of how to choose 
between different trade-facilitating tools, including mutual recognition and equi-
valence. 
The European Commission stated that recognition of equivalence is a potentially 
powerful tool, but that the mechanism can be technically complex in practise, 
which could explain why it is rarely applied (WTO 2002b: 12). Further, because of 
the complexity involved the Commission does not believe that the principle of 
equivalency recognition can be considered of general applicability. The 
Commission nevertheless stated that where the principle can be applied, ´...it is a 
valuable instrument of trade facilitation while fully respecting the regulatory 
autonomy of the partiesµ (WTO 2002b: 12).  
 
 
The Commission further presented a ´case studyµ containing instances of 
equivalence (see box 2) (WTO 2002b: 13). 
 
 
Equivalence and Mutual Recognition in Trade Arrangements 
Centre for Food Policy / Norwegian Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 2004 
26 
 
BOX 2: Instances of equivalence reported in the EU 
The EU·s ´New Approachµ legislation does not set mandatory standards, but 
recognises them as a means towards achieving regulatory objectives. The standards 
give ´presumption of conformityµ with the (obligatory) requirements of the 
relevant Directive. 
In an Agreement on Marine Equipment between the EU and the US, being 
negotiated in the context of the EU-US Transatlantic Economic Partnership 
(TEP), the potential recognition of equivalence of regulations would be based on 
the Conventions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which form 
the technical basis for the regulations both of the EU and the US in this sector. 
 
The Commission also emphasised that MRAs could be important in facilitating 
trade, but not in all situations. The Commission·s opinion was that MRAs are for 
use when ´...the potential partners have paved the way by bringing their systems 
close enough to make MRAs workable, while either not addressing questions of 
harmonization, or accepting that harmonization is too remote an objective to be 
practicable within any reasonable time-frameµ (WTO 200b: 15). The preparing of 
an MRA is thus conditioned on comparable levels of technical infrastructure 
between the parties. The costs and benefit of MRAs further have to be regarded in 
the light of political and commercial competition aspects.  
The European Commission thus recognizes that equivalence and mutual 
recognition can play an important role as trade-facilitating tools, but nevertheless 
proposes a cautious approach in selecting the right instrument in concrete 
situations. According to the Commission the selection has to depend on ´...the 
characteristics of the markets, the regulatory environment in the third country or 
region concerned, and the willingness on the part of industries, regulators and other 
parties to achieve the agreed objectivesµ (WTO 2002b: 22). 
In March 2003, Japan submitted a paper to the TBT Committee titled ´A Policy 
Framework for the Acceptance of Results of Conformity Assessment Proceduresµ 
(WTO 2003c). The paper included a discussion on the usefulness of MRAs and 
equivalence of conformity assessment procedures. The paper, which encouraged 
the acceptance of conformity assessment results conducted outside of the impor-
ting country, was presented in a Committee meeting in May 2003 (WTO 2003d). In 
this meeting, the Members recognized the usefulness of such exchanges of views 
and experiences and expressed the need for further discussions. In a subsequent 
submission, Japan further proposed to examine the use of appropriate accreditation 
schemes as a complement to or as a basis for MRAs (WTO 2003j). Japan also 
stressed the importance of strengthening the interrelation between mandatory 
regulations and voluntary conformity assessment systems in terms of reducing 
duplicative costs or in the light of the trend of de-regulation. 
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In 2003, several Member submissions were made to the Third Triennial Review. 
Under the heading ´labellingµ, the EC11 stated in its submission the need ´to 
examine the application of equivalence or mutual recognition where appropriateµ 
(WTO 2003a: 3). The EC also mentioned equivalence and mutual recognition 
agreements as means to facilitate trade.  
New Zealand stated in its submission, that it is a ´...strong believer in the value 
of pursuing mutual recognition of conformity assessment proceduresµ (WTO 
2003b: 1). The Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement was again presen-
ted as an example of how to better understand the circumstances in which an equi-
valence approach is likely to work.12 New Zealand also presented several examples 
of standards equivalence from the non-food sector. However, it was also recog-
nized that it is more difficult to operationalize equivalence in the TBT context than 
in the SPS context, and that transparency of equivalence agreements thus becomes 
even more important in the TBT context (WTO 2003b: 5). Still, New Zealand 
favours the application of the concept of equivalence under the TBT Agreement 
for both technical regulations and standards. 
Egypt believes that equivalence should be considered in a pragmatic manner and 
that co-operation between regulatory authorities is an important way of enhancing 
equivalence (WTO 2003g). Brazil highlights the importance of developing mutually 
compatible and worldwide accepted conformity assessment programmes, e.g. 
through MRAs (WTO 2003h). The United States has recognized the relevance of 
mutual recognition, equivalence and MRAs for the TBT Committee, but in a sub-
mission to the Triennial Review, the U.S. government nevertheless stated that 
MRAs can be successful only in limited situations (WTO 2003i). The United States 
is more interested in focusing on the implementation of Article 6.4 of the TBT 
Agreement, which would enable suppliers to use qualified conformity assessment 
bodies of their choice to provide testing and certification to a given Member·s 
requirements. Thailand repeated its support of the view that equivalence is impor-
tant in the TBT context and further suggested that the TBT Committee could con-
sider compiling information on Members· experiences in order to lay out actions to 
be taken to fulfil the obligations of Article 2.7 (WTO 2003k). Thailand also agreed 
with a proposal to invite ISO to share its action on a move to declare specific 
national, regional or international standards as equivalent rather than setting out 
one standard as the sole option ((WTO 2003k: 3). 
The Third Triennial Review report was issued on 11 November 2003 (WTO 
2003f).13 The report did not say much about the operation of equivalence and 
mutual recognition under the TBT Agreement and did little to enhance the work 
on these issues. This slow progress is probably due to both the limited number of 
submissions on these issues made by the member countries and to the lack of 
                                           
 11 We use the term EC (European Community) instead of EU (European Union) because this 
is the name used in the EU·s dealings with the WTO. 
 12 See also Chapter 6.12 of this report. 
 13 See Annex I in this report for the text on equivalency and mutual recognition in the Third 
Triennial Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement of Technical 
Barriers to Trade. 
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initiatives with regard to taking the lead on these issues in the TBT Committee. In 
fact, such initiatives were taken in the SPS Committee concerning the issue of equi-
valence for sanitary measures.14 
Nevertheless, the Third Triennial Review repeated the statement made at the 
Second Triennial Review on the importance of giving positive consideration to 
accepting as equivalent technical regulations of other Members as provided for 
under Article 2.7 (WTO 2003f: 3). Further, it was noted that equivalence can be an 
element of good regulatory practise and is relevant to conformity assessment as 
foreseen under Article 6.1 (ibid.). The TBT Committee stated that this should not 
detract the development of international standards. Concerning the issue of good 
regulatory practise, the Committee agreed to initiate a process of sharing 
experiences on equivalence, particularly with regard to how the concept is imple-
mented in practise. 
The Committee also referred to the Second Triennial Review, where an indica-
tive list of different approaches to facilitate the acceptance of conformity assess-
ment results was identified, namely: 
Mutual recognition agreements of conformity to specific regulations 
Co-operative arrangements between domestic and foreign conformity assess-
ment bodies in the voluntary sector 
The use of accreditation to qualify conformity assessment bodies 
Government designation 
Unilateral recognition of results of foreign conformity assessment 
Manufacturer·s/supplier·s declarations. 
 
The Committee agreed to further discuss these approaches with a view to analysing 
them in the light of Articles 5 and 6 of the TBT Agreement (WTO 2003f: 6). 
Further on in the Third Triennial Review report the Committee explicitly 
mentions Article 6.3 of the TBT Agreement, which deals with MRAs. The 
Committee notes however, that ´..appropriate confidence building measures, inclu-
ding accreditation, could facilitate the acceptance of conformity assessment results 
without entering into MRAsµ (WTO 2003f: 7). Even though the Committee states 
that drawing up MRAs can be a useful approach to facilitate acceptance of con-
formity assessment results, it also recognizes the difficulties facing the negotiation 
and implementation of such agreements.  
The Third Triennial Review report was adopted on the TBT Committee meeting 
on 7 November 2003. At this meeting a reference was made to the fact that the 
Codex Alimentarius Secretariat had made a request to the WTO Secretariat concer-
ning the operation of equivalence and mutual recognition within the TBT 
Agreement. The WTO Secretariat also informed the Committee that a represen-
tative of the Secretariat would attend the meeting of the Codex Committee on 
Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification Systems in Australia in 
December 2003 to explain the relevant provisions of the TBT Agreement on 
                                           
 14 Cf. personal communication with Australian delegate participating in SPS Committee 
meetings.  
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equivalence and mutual recognition and report on the work of the TBT 
Committee, especially the Third Triennial Review. 
The Third Triennial Review report was placed on the agenda for the TBT 
Committee meeting on 23 March 2004. On this meeting the issues of MRAs, 
mutual recognition and equivalence were not afforded much attention. However, it 
was confirmed that a process of sharing experiences on equivalence would be 
initiated, particularly on how the concept was implemented with regard to good 
regulatory practise. 
After the discussion on the Third Triennial Review was concluded, Columbia 
submitted a new communication on the issue of equivalence (WTO 2004). Here, 
Columbia stated that the TBT Committee should seek to design a procedure that 
facilitates equivalence of regulations between WTO member countries. 
Alternatively, the TBT Committee should try to develop a procedure that can shed 
light on the differences in regulatory processes and that makes it possible to 
working towards mutual adjustment (WTO 2004: 5). 
To sum up, equivalence and mutual recognition have been recognized by the 
TBT Committee as important and relevant trade-facilitating tools with regard to 
mandatory technical regulations, voluntary standards, as well as conformity assess-
ment procedures. Although discussing these issues for many years, the TBT 
Committee has not produced a document clarifying the operation of equivalence or 
mutual recognition within the TBT Agreement. Neither has the Committee given 
any guidance on the standing of food inspection and certification systems in 
relation to the application of these concepts. Further, the Committee has not yet 
requested Codex to the work on equivalence and/or mutual recognition. The 
Codex·s position under the TBT Agreement is thus perceived to be less clear than 
its position under the SPS Agreement. 
For many years, the Members have continued to exchange views and 
experiences regarding the application of the two concepts. Some members, such as 
New Zealand, Canada and the European Union, have actively expressed their will 
to discuss the issues of equivalence and mutual recognition in the TBT Committee 
and have also provided a number of contributions addressing these issues. Other 
members have been more passive in following up the work. Some of this passivity 
might be explained by the sheer complexity of the matter. However, it is also clear 
that there are different opinions among WTO Members on the question of how far 
this work should proceed within the framework of the WTO. The United States, 
for example, seems to be lukewarm to the attempts at pushing theses issues high on 
the agenda. Thus, the work on equivalence in the TBT Committee seems to be a 
much slower process compared to the work on this issue in the SPS Committee. 
Moreover, so far not much information has been provided on the practical aspects 
of performing judgements of equivalence of technical regulations. Thus, there is 
still need for further information and experience sharing on these issues as well as 
stronger and more dedicated initiatives from key players.  
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Equivalence and mutual recognition have been on the agenda of Codex Alimenta-
rius for many years. As early as 1995, Codex adopted the document "Principles for 
Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification" including the principle of 
equivalence in relation to inspection and certification systems (CAC/GL 20-1995). 
In 1997 the new "Guidelines for the Design, Operation, Assessment and Accreditation of 
Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification Systems" included equivalence in two 
of its sections (CAC/GL 26²1997). However, in 1999 Codex adopted a special 
guide solely focusing on equivalence: "Guidelines for the Development of Equivalence 
Agreements regarding Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification Systems" 
(CAC/GL 34²1999). 
The SPS Agreement refers to Codex Alimentarius as the relevant international 
organization for the development of food standards, guidelines and recommenda-
tions. The emphasis on equivalence as a trade-facilitating tool in the SPS Agree-
ment provides the necessary legitimacy for developing guidelines within the frame-
work of Codex. The TBT Agreement also refers to the relevance of international 
standardizing bodies, but there is no explicit reference to Codex. However, the 
WTO dispute on trade descriptions for Sardines clearly illustrated that Codex also 
is an important reference point for the TBT Agreement (Hauser 2003). Conse-
quently, it should also be legitimate to develop Codex guidelines on equivalence in 
relation to TBT measures. Codex also intends to further pursue work on these 
concepts in the years to come. 
In the Strategic Framework for 2003²2007 the Codex members confirm under 
Objective 1 ´Promoting Sound Regulatory Frameworkµ15 that one of the priorities 
of Codex is to provide guidance for the practical application of the concepts of 
equivalence and mutual recognition for both sanitary and technical/quality 
measures. In the Codex Committee on Food Import and Export Inspection and 
Certification Systems (CCFICS), the issue of equivalence has been discussed since 
the Committee·s fifth session in 1997. The Committee has noted that there is 
support for the development of guidelines that address the issue of equivalence 
judgements and priority has been given to the work on equivalence of sanitary mea-
sures. The work in CCFICS has so far resulted in the development of µGuidelines 
on the Judgement of Equivalence of Sanitary Measures Associated with Food 
Inspection and Certification Systemsµ, which were adopted at the Codex 
Commission meeting in Rome 30 June ² 7 July 2003. However, the work on guide-
lines for equivalence and mutual recognition in relation to TBT measures has not 
been that straightforward. 
                                           
 15 The whole text of this objective is included in Annex II of this report. 
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Harmonization is a key activity of Codex, but in many areas there are no interna-
tional standards and different regulatory measures thus create uncertainty for con-
sumers and trade problems. In such cases, one option is to enter into agreements 
involving judgement of equivalence.  
For several years there has been a discussion in CCFICS on the need for deve-
loping the same type of guidelines for the judgement of equivalence for technical 
measures as for sanitary measures. In December 2000 at the 10th meeting of 
CCFICS, the µProposed Draft Guidelines for the Judgement of Equivalence of Technical 
Regulations Associated with Food Inspection and Certification Systemsµ were discussed. The 
proposed guidelines were set up much in the same way as the guidelines for 
sanitary measures. However, the Committee noted that there was a need for further 
clarification as to how equivalence should be handled with regard to technical 
measures. Thus, the work on these guidelines was deferred pending an elaboration 
of a discussion paper on this issue. The discussion paper was to include an exami-
nation of the need for the elaboration of guidelines on the judgement of equiva-
lence of technical regulations to ensure conformity with essential quality require-
ments. Moreover, the paper should also include a presentation of pertinent 
examples for consideration and recommendations relating to the elements in the 
guideline. 
The discussion paper was prepared by a drafting group led by Australia and was 
discussed at the 11th meeting of CCFICS 2²6 December 2002. The Committee had 
stated that there was still a lack of actual examples on the application of 
equivalence of technical regulations or conformity assessment procedures. Further, 
the Committee acknowledged that there was still a need for further clarification on 
how equivalence would be applied in relation to technical measures in contrast to 
SPS measures.  
Thus, the Committee decided that a drafting group under the direction of 
Australia, with the assistance of Brazil, Canada, France, Norway, Switzerland and 
the United States, would revise the discussion paper for circulation, comments and 
further considerations at the next meeting. It was agreed that the paper would be 
revised on the basis of written comments submitted at the current meeting. The 
revision should also take into consideration comments to be submitted in response 
to a request for specific or potential examples of problems in trade that were or 
could be solved through the application of equivalence and mutual recognition 
agreements. Further, clarification would be sought from the WTO/TBT 
Committee, through the Codex Secretariat, on the operation of equivalence and 
mutual recognition within the framework of the TBT Agreement. It was noted that 
the discussion paper should be prepared to facilitate the Committee·s discussions 
related to the potential of future guidelines.  
Many countries signalled that they were negative to go further with the guide-
lines in their comments to the second draft. Canada felt that the necessary 
resources to develop such guidelines would greatly outweigh the benefits. Mexico 
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questioned the need for any guidelines at all. New Zealand did not support deve-
lopment of the guide at the time, and the United States could not see that any 
specific need for such work had been identified. The EU suggested in their 
response to the draft, that the CCFICS should confine its work to judgement of 
equivalence of conformity assessment since the terms of reference for the CCFICS 
is limited to inspection and certification systems. However, the EU did not reiterate 
the support for a guide on equivalence in relation to conformity assessment at the 
12th meeting of the CCFICS.  
In contrast to all these negative responses, several countries contributed with 
practical examples on equivalence in the preparations of the new draft. Australia 
gave examples of situations where food inspection and certification systems relating 
to technical regulations had created trade problems that could possibly be solved by 
the application of equivalence. Australia mentioned, e.g., that it could be of interest 
to accept different standards and certification for organic food and food labelling 
practices as equivalent in order to improve market access. Several countries stressed 
the problem of determining equivalence of many technical measures because of the 
difficulties of identifying objectives separate from the design and specifications. 
Uncertainties concerning the relationship between judgements of equivalence of 
technical measures vs. judgements of equivalence of conformity assessment proce-
dures also seemed to be an element that needed further clarification. Another view 
was that challenges with regard to trade facilitation resided more with the legiti-
macy of a TBT measure than with the determination of its equivalence with 
another country's measure.  
At the 12th Session, only Australia and Norway expressed their support to con-
tinue work on a guideline on equivalence for technical regulations in relation to 
inspection and certification systems. Norway stressed the need for further clarifi-
cation of the links between technical regulations and conformity assessment proce-
dures and the need to take into account the work of other international 
standardization organizations like ISO on these issues. Norway proposed that the 
Committee could continue to investigate further guidance on equivalence in parallel 
with the ongoing discussion in the WTO/TBT Committee. However, the CCFICS 
decided not to pursue work on the judgement of equivalence of technical regula-
tions associated with food inspection and certification systems. The Committee 
nevertheless did leave open the possibility for coming back to the issue, since such 
work in fact was included in the Medium-Term Plan from 2003 to 2007.  
The fact that several other international organizations than Codex have established 
or are developing guidelines on equivalence and mutual recognition provides 
opportunities to exchange information and experience that all parties could benefit 
from.  
In May 2003, the OIE ² the international body for animal health (Office 
International des Epizooties) adopted ´The Terrestial Animal Health Codeµ including 
´Guidelines for Reaching a Judgement of Equivalence of Sanitary Measures µ(Chapter 1.3.7). 
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This document treats e.g. the prerequisite considerations in a judgement of equiva-
lence, principles for judgement of equivalence, and sequences of steps to be taken 
in judgement of equivalence. The Interim Commission on Phytosanitary Measures 
² ICPM is the body for implementation of the international plant health con-
vention. The SPS Committee has requested the ICPM to develop guidelines on 
equivalence in relation to phytosanitary measures. In May 2004, the ICPM com-
pleted a quite comprehensive draft for consultation among the members: 
´Guidelines on the Concept of Equivalence of Phytosanitary Measures and its Application in 
International tradeµ.  
The work of Codex, OIE and ICPM concerns intergovernmental standardi-
zation. In contrast, the work of ISO relates to non-governmental standardization. 
ISO has on several occasions reported to the TBT Committee on its work in 
relation to equivalence and mutual recognition. In its reports, ISO has for instance 
stated that ´...the essence of the MRA is the recognition by each party of the 
equivalence of the activities of the other partiesµ (WTO 2003e: 7). However, ISO 
has also stated that the recognition of equivalence of applicable technical regula-
tions or standards remains a difficult issue. The ISO/IEC "Guide 68 on Mutual 
Recognition Arrangements" was adopted in 2002. As accounted for in the presentation 
of the work of the TBT Committee, this guide provides an introduction to the 
development, issuance and operation of arrangements for the recognition and 
acceptance of results produced by bodies undertaking conformity assessment 
activities.16 The ISO guide is intended to apply to unregulated marketplace 
transaction extending across borders from one country to another.17  
The use of equivalence and mutual recognition in facilitating trade is being 
discussed in intergovernmental, and private and semi-private international organiza-
tions. The WTO is the most influential intergovernmental organization with regard 
to regulating and governing global trade. The discussion on equivalence and mutual 
recognition in the SPS and TBT committees is therefore of utmost importance. 
The discussion on mutual recognition has been going on in the TBT Committee 
for many years. Equivalence is considered to be an important supplementary tool, 
together with standardization, under both the SPS and TBT agreements. Moreover, 
MRAs are relevant for regulations, standards and conformity assessment 
procedures under both agreements.  
Until now, the SPS Committee·s work on equivalence has had more progress 
than the similar work on equivalence and mutual recognition in the TBT 
                                           
 16 The term Mutual Recognition Arrangement is normally used to indicate non-governmental 
co-operation, while the term Mutual Recognition Agreement indicates co-operation between 
government agencies. 
 17 In this connection it should be mentioned that the TBT Agreement also covers conformity 
assessment performed by non-governmental bodies, though in an indirect manner through 
Article 8.2: ´Members shall ensure that their central government bodies rely on conformity assessment proce-
dures operated by non-governmental bodies...µ 
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Committee. Based on an initiative from the SPS Committee, the CAC actually 
developed and adopted a guideline on the judgement of equivalence associated with 
food inspection and certification systems. This illustrates that the WTO can (and 
maybe should?) play an important role in pursuing initiatives on developing models 
for the methods and mechanisms through which equivalence and mutual recogni-
tion can be applied on a bilateral and multilateral basis. Much of this work is 
presently going on at the national level and in international private or semi-private 
organizations such as ISO. This is also true for the application of equivalence and 
mutual recognition with regard to food trade. There is thus a need to co-ordinate 
the different activities related to these topics.  
In the next chapter, we will present some examples of actual arrangements 
where equivalence and mutual recognition of technical measures and conformity 
assessment procedures have been involved. These examples illustrate both the rele-
vance of the concepts for world trade as well as the potential for increasing our 
understanding of how the concepts can be operationalized and applied in concrete 
situations, by drawing on the experiences of states and international organizations. 
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There are a number of trade arrangements that include mutual recognition and/or 
judgement of equivalence. However, many of the examples that can be found in 
the food sector primarily involve sanitary measures. We have not been able to find 
many examples of acceptance of equivalence in relation to technical measures. Still, 
quite a few mutual recognition agreements involve equivalence assessments of con-
formity assessment procedures. We will take a closer look at these examples and 
relate them to the previous discussion on equivalence and mutual recognition as 
trade-facilitating tools. We will also present examples from other sectors, insofar as 
these examples contain elements relevant for the food sector. Some of the exam-
ples were already presented in NILF Working Paper 2002-36.18 However, we have 
reanalysed them and placed them into the context of the present discussion. 
                                           
 18 See Elvestad (2002). 
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Organic agriculture is normally pursued with declared objectives of contributing to 
both food safety and quality. However, organic farming is first and foremost a 
mode of production that aims at utilising natural resources in a sustainable way. 
The term ´organicµ is a process claim, not a product claim. Products of organic 
agriculture are defined by the technology and inputs used, and not explicitly by the 
inherent properties of the product itself.19 The core question for determining what 
constitutes an organic product is not how safe it is, but how it was produced, e.g., 
in a sustainable and environmentally friendly way.  
The Codex Guidelines for the Production, Processing, Labelling and Marketing 
of Organically Produced Foods define ´organicµ as a ´labelling term that denotes 
products that have been produced in accordance with organic production standards 
and certified by a duly constituted certification body or authorityµ. The Codex 
standards that apply to the safety of organic products are the same as for conven-
tional foods. Still, the Codex guidelines for organically produced food are impor-
tant in ensuring a fair and transparent trading system for these products. The 
authenticity of the organic claim, including the labelling requirements, is particularly 
important. The Codex guidelines do in fact reflect the general approach of Codex 
to labelling (Doyran 2002). 
Thus, a regulation or standard for organic farming will be more of a technical 
measure (such as labelling and production related requirements) than a sanitary 
measure (requirements related to the health hazards of the product itself). 
So, what has this to do with equivalence and mutual recognition? The fact is that 
the organic market is growing rapidly and so does the ´diversityµ of both govern-
mental and private sector organic standards, certification and accreditation. This 
has lead to a non-transparent market place causing problems for producers and 
traders as well as consumers (Bowen 2002). Thus, an international effort has been 
initiated in order to address these problems through harmonization, equivalence 
and mutual recognition.20 
The Conference on International Harmonisation and Equivalence in Organic 
Agriculture was held in Nuremberg, Germany 18²19 February 2002. The 
Conference was organized by the International Federation of Organic Agriculture 
Movements (IFOAM) in co-operation with the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO) and United Nations Conference of Trade and 
Environment (UNCTAD). 
High on the agenda was the need to develop models and mechanisms for the use 
of harmonization and equivalence, as well as mutual recognition, as practical trade-
facilitating tools. One of the models for the establishment of equivalence in organic 
                                           
 19 See Haen (1999). 
 20 See in particular IFOAM (2002a, 2002b). 
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agriculture that was discussed, was the work on this issue in CAC. In particular, the 
Guidelines for Organic Foods, as well as the guidance documents on Food Import 
and Export Inspection and Certification Systems, including the proposed guidelines 
on the Judgement of Equivalence of Technical Regulations, were addressed The 
Conference concluded that ´the Codex Alimentarius model can facilitate nego-
tiations around inter-governmentally agreed standards and mechanisms for 
harmonization and equivalenceµ (IFOAM 2002b).  
The participants agreed on the need to develop an operating system that 
facilitates trade so that disputes involving organic standards can be prevented long 
before they reach WTO as (possibly) TBT related disputes. Thus, the Conference 
expressed the need to develop options for international equivalence, in addition to 
promoting bilateral recognition agreements. 
Pascal Liu of FAO stated that the Conference had laid down the foundations for 
´..a collaborative process ultimately leading to some form of mutual recognition of 
organic agriculture standards and certification systemsµ, while the President of 
IFOAM, Gunnar Rundgren, concluded that the ´...need to have a multilateral 
mechanism for establishing equivalence between different systems of regulation is 
apparentµ (IFOAM 2002c). 
An important result of the Conference was a joint initiative of IFOAM, FAO 
and UNCTAD to establish the International Task Force on Harmonisation and 
Equivalence in Organic Agriculture (ITF), which was launched on 18 February 
2003 in Nuremberg, Germany (UNCTAD 2003). The Task Force was a practical 
response to the difficulties faced by organic producers and exporters due to the 
hundreds of different organic regulations, standards and labels worldwide, and a 
follow-up to the recommendations of the Conference.21  
At its first meeting in February 2003 the Task Force stated that the work would 
commence with a review of the existing standards, regulations and conformity 
assessment systems. It will then move towards formulating concrete proposals on 
mechanisms for achieving harmonization and equivalence in the organic sector and 
means of facilitating access to organic markets, particularly by developing countries 
and smallholders. Moreover, the Task Force included in its work plan an initiative 
to develop discussion papers on WTO/TBT and organic trade facilitation, and on 
models and mechanisms for equivalence and mutual recognition (International 
Task Force on Harmonisation and Equivalence in Organic Agriculture 2003). 
The Task Force had its second meeting in October 2003. On the agenda for this 
meeting was the need for exploring models and mechanisms of equivalence and 
mutual recognition.22 A presentation on this topic was made at the meeting, and a 
discussion paper based on this presentation was subsequently published.23 The 
paper presents examples and models with regard to harmonization, mutual 
recognition and equivalence from other industries and seeks to learn from their 
                                           
 21 See IFOAM (2002a, 2002b). 
 22 See UNCTAD homepage: http://r0.unctad.org/trade_env/test1/openF1.htm  
 23 Sasha Courville and David Crucefix (2004): Existing and Potential Models and Mechanisms for 
Harmonization, Equivalency and Mutual Recognition. Discussion Paper, March 2004. ITF, 
UNCTAD & FAO. 
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experience and identify models and/or components that may be applied to organic 
trade (Courville and Crucefix 2004: 2). We will highlight some of the important 
issues discussed in the paper. 
Courville and Crucefix (2004) stress that there is a strong linkage between 
harmonisation of standards and equivalence of conformity assessment procedures. 
They further point out that equivalence is likely to be a required tool in convergence of 
organic standards even if some harmonisation is achieved. Japan, EU and United States all 
have mechanisms in place for facilitating trade in organic food through equivalence 
assessments and/or one- and two-way recognitions of conformity assessment 
procedures. However, Courville and Crucefix point out the difficulties in applying 
and maintaining these mechanisms in practise. They thus see the need to explore 
further the elements that could enter into different trade facilitating models and 
mechanisms with regard to organic food. 
Mutual recognition would be the simplest step towards reducing possible ´over-
regulationµ. The end point of such negotiations could be that conformity assess-
ment bodies in the exporting country would be competent to verify compliance of 
organic producers to the standards of the importing country and that this recogni-
tion would be based on the approval by the authorities in the exporting country. 
Further, a basis for developing equivalence could be international standards, e.g., 
Codex standards for Organic Production. However, Courville and Crucefix point 
to the fact that few national regulations refer to Codex standards and guidelines 
and that there is thus little common structure to commence the process. With other 
words, in order to facilitate negotiations on equivalence and mutual recognition, 
there is a need for some convergence to have taken place, e.g. through international 
standardization. Otherwise, some complicated equivalence would have to be made 
while standards evolve. Nevertheless, if the involved parties would focus on what 
are common regulatory objectives in national regulations, i.e. the essential elements, 
equivalence agreements could easier be reached in the spirit of EU ´New 
Approach.µ 
Courville and Crucefix discuss the possibility of combining the elaboration of a 
common international standard ² a Basic Standard ² with the acceptance and 
recognition of a fixed number of regional standards. Different regional organic 
standards could thus be recognized as equivalent as long as they share some main 
characteristics of the Basic Standard. The process thus requires equivalence assess-
ments. Moreover, it allows for (necessary) variations related to agroecology or stage 
of development of organic agriculture, while at the same time rationalizing the 
number of organic production standards and avoiding a one-size-fits-all standard. 
Moreover, approved regional standards could replace many of the existing private 
standards.  
IFOAM has already launched a mechanism to recognize approved regional 
standards, but this process has until now taken place in isolation from government 
regulations. As an intergovernmental body, the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
could however provide the legitimacy necessary for linking such mechanisms to 
arrangements and agreements involving governments and national regulations. 
With fewer standards around the world, equivalence assessments would be much 
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easier. However, this requires co-operation and co-ordination of the private and 
public sector (i.e. through combining the strengths of the private based IFOAM 
and the government based Codex). The setting up of an international forum where 
both private and public sector actors could meet is one way of enhancing such co-
operation and co-ordination. 
Courville and Crucefix underline that complete harmonisation is not only hard, 
but in the context of organic standards it is undesirable. Equivalence will therefore 
with certainty be part of the trade facilitation process with regard to organic food. 
To harmonise at least some core values will however facilitate the process of jud-
ging equivalence. Thus, in the view of Courville and Crucefix some harmonisation 
of rules is desirable. Equivalence judgements will nevertheless be needed to main-
tain regional and even national appropriateness of organic standards. The processes 
of harmonisation and equivalence assessments are thus strongly interlinked. 
 
There are a few examples of actual agreements involving mutual recognition and 
equivalence with regard to organic food. One recent example is a recognition agree-
ment between Japan and United States from March 2002.24 
The agreement replaces and expands upon a temporary agreement that allows U.S. 
plant-based organic food ingredients to be exported to Japan and sold as organic. 
The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF) has officially re-
cognised that the United States Department of Agriculture·s (USDA) national orga-
nic standard for the production, handling and processing of plant-based organic 
agricultural products meets the requirements of the Japanese agricultural standard.  
However, the agreement stipulates that three substances allowed under the U.S. 
organic standard, should not be used in raw or processed organic food exported to 
Japan. USDA envisions verification of the non-use of these substances by an 
accredited certifying agent (ACA) to be based on a paper review (audit) and visual 
examination (on-site) process. In order to facilitate acceptance of the product, a 
compliance statement declaring the applicable prohibitions must be entered into 
the remarks section of the export certificate. The compliance statement for Japan 
is, ´Products covered under this export certificate are not known to be produced 
with alkali-extracted humic acid, lignin sulfonate and potassium bicarbonateµ. 
The U.S.²Japan agreement was based on an examination of equivalence of the 
organic products grading system in the United States to that in Japan. The examina-
tion resulted in a statement by the MAFF that the grading system of organic 
agricultural products and food processed from organic agricultural products 
(referred to as ´organic productsµ) in the U.S., which is stipulated in the National 
Organic Program, is equivalent to the grading system of organic products under the 
                                           
 24 See information on this agreement on the homepages of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture's Agricultural Marketing Service: http://www.ams.usda.gov/nop/ 
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Japanese Agricultural Standard. In order to maintain equivalence, MAFF wanted to 
confirm that the U.S. government had the following intentions25: 
In case the U.S. side amends the above-mentioned Program, to notify the 
Japanese side of the contents of the amendment in advance; 
To provide the Japanese side, upon request, with as much information as practi-
cable, including whether the inspection and certification system on organic 
products is properly implemented in the U.S.; 
In case the Japanese side notifies in advance the U.S. side of its inspection plan 
on the Registered Foreign Certification Organizations in the U.S., to cooperate 
in such inspection, as much as practicable; and 
To take necessary action to prevent the use of the following substances in 
organic products which will be exported to Japan:(1) alkali extracted humic acid 
(2) lignin sulfonate (3) potassium bicarbonate. 
 
The exception of the three substances means that Japan has only accepted the U.S. 
system as partially equivalent. However, the U.S. is considering a general ban of the 
three substances, so that producers only have to conform to one set of rules and 
avoid the demand for any additional documentation when exporting to Japan. 
Thus, a harmonization process is in practice taking place with regard to the two 
countries· rules for organic foods. The agreement has been notified to the WTO 
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Committee) (WTO 2002a). 
The USDA is working with several governments with the aim of recognizing their 
ability to assess and accredit certifying agents as meeting the requirements of the 
U.S. National Organic Program (NOP). Currently, such co-operation is taking 
place with Canada, Denmark, Israel, New Zealand, Spain and the United Kingdom.  
The USDA has already determined that a number of foreign government 
conformity assessment programs are sufficient to ensure conformity with the 
NOP. These determinations allow organic certification organizations in good 
standing to apply the NOP technical standards to certify operations that produce 
or handle agricultural products that will be sold, labelled or represented as organic 
in the United States. Production or handling operations certified by an organization 
that is recognized under these determinations may only use the USDA organic seal 
on their products when those products have been produced and handled in accor-
dance to the NOP regulations. Thus, these agreements are for all practical means 
compliance agreements, but still based on equivalence determinations for the con-
formity assessment procedures. As of 2 December 2002, the following foreign 
government conformity assessment programs were recognized as sufficient: New 
Zealand (two programs), Quebec (six programs), United Kingdom (one program) 
and Denmark (one program). 
                                           
 25 See letter from MAFF to USDA, dated February 6, 2001. Available online at: 
http://www.ams.usda.gov/nop/NOP/TradeIssues/JapanTranslation.pdf 
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In the United States, an equivalence determination is facilitated at the formal 
request of a foreign government. USDA is currently working with the governments 
of India, Japan, Australia and the European Union to determine whether their 
organic certification programs are equivalent to the technical requirements and 
conformity assessment system of the U.S. National Organic Program. 
26
The access of third countries to the European Organic Food Market is generally 
based on a concept of equivalence. The EU regulations on organic production are 
set out in Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2092/91 and its amendments. Article 11 
of this regulation specifies the requirements for importing products from countries 
outside the EU. The provisions apply to all processed and unprocessed food 
products from plants or animals and to wild products. Three methods are used for 
meeting the requirements for importing organic foods into the EU.  
Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 94/92 lays down detailed rules for 
implementing the arrangements provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
2092/91. It requires the EU authorities to evaluate and approve a third country·s 
organic standards and its organic inspection system as equivalent to the EU require-
ments. Where other countries· inspections are carried out by private certifiers the 
EU will evaluate the exporting country·s system for accrediting private certifiers. 
Approved countries appear on a list annexed to Commission Regulation (EEC) 
No. 94/92. The list may specify approved regions, production units, or inspection 
bodies within the country. The EU provides formatted tables for enabling compari-
son of third country standards against those of the EU. The information must in-
clude types of products intended for export; rules of production; rules on the 
inspection system and a description of how it is organised; and any available reports 
on the effectiveness of the implementation of production and inspection rules. 
This Third Country list of approved exporters was initially considered to be the 
main route for import of organic products. However, by 2003 ² twelve years after 
the regulation was published ² only eight countries were on the list and most 
products moreover enters instead under the importer derogation (see below), 
which is a process which relies on document review by Member State admini-
strations; a considerable more costly process (Courville and Crucefix 2004). 
 
EU rules allow Member States to authorise an importer to import products from a 
country not included in the Article 11 list of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
2092/91 (cf. amendments of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2083/92). In order to 
do this, the importer must furnish the Member State with sufficient evidence to 
show that the imported product was produced according to organic production 
rules equivalent to EU standards. Further, it must be proved that the inspection 
                                           
 26 See Commins and Wai (2002). 
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measures are equivalent to EU inspection requirements as well as permanently and 
effectively applied. Moreover, the certification body must operate in compliance 
with ISO/IEC Guide 65. It is important to notice that Member States and even 
regional authorities tend to implement this provision differently with respect to the 
nature of evidence that must be supplied. A majority of the imported organic 
products are currently entering the EU according to this method. 
 
A recent amendment to Council Regulation 2092/91 has provided a mechanism 
under which certification organisations approved in EU countries could be 
approved for certifying imports from third countries. The amendment allows the 
Member State to assess a third country·s inspection body (certification body) and 
request the Commission to approve it. It can then be added to the Article 11 list. 
The EU rules for market access of organic products from third countries do not 
require identical procedures, sameness or structural congruence of the foreign 
regulatory systems. Third countries are given access to the EU marked while at the 
same time being allowed to develop their own organic food production and certifi-
cation systems. Thus, the EU rules are based on determination of equivalence. 
However, the foreign systems must achieve comparable effectiveness. Moreover, 
the burden of demonstrating equivalence is on the exporting country. Nevertheless, 
equivalence is already a tool that is much used under EU rules in order to facilitate 
trade in organic products between the EU and third countries. 
Based on our survey of trade agreements, Canada stands out as a country that has 
been active in using equivalence and mutual recognition as trade-facilitating tools in 
the food sector. This is especially true for fish and seafood production where 
Canadian authorities have negotiated so-called equivalence agreements and memo-
randa of understanding/mutual recognition agreements with eight countries: 
Australia, Ecuador, Iceland, Indonesia, Japan (two agreements), New Zealand and 
the Philippines.27 A short presentation of the relevance of these arrangements for 
technical measures is included in annex III of this report. We will look closer at 
how the concept of equivalence is applied in three of the arrangements: 
Canada/Australia, Canada/New Zealand and Canada/Thailand. 
The Memorandum of Understanding between Australia and Canada was signed 
in June 1993. The Agreement implies that the Australian Quarantine and Inspec-
tion Service and the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans will monitor 
fish and fish products for export to the other party for compliance with the 
applicable standards for fish and fish products. The parties will recognize export 
                                           
 27 The full text of these agreements can be found on the website of the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency: www.inspection.gc.ca/. 
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certificates issued by the participating agencies, thus minimizing the requirements 
for further inspections and analysis. The certificates will ensure that the exporter 
meets the importing country requirements.  
Beyond that, the Agreement leaves inspection with the exporting country with-
out any additional inspection and analysis on arrival. The parties thus mutually 
accept each other·s food control and inspection systems as equivalent in order to 
ensure compliance with applicable regulations and standards. The Agreement thus 
combines a required compliance of the regulations/standards of the importing 
country with a judgement of equivalence of conformity assessment procedures.  
The Equivalence Agreement between Canada and New Zealand was signed in 
April 1996. In this agreement, equivalence is defined as ´the recognition that the 
exporting country·s regulatory and technical measures achieve the level of health 
protection desired by the importing countryµ. The definition further specifies 
´these measures may be acceptable even if they are not identical to those used by 
the importing countryµ.  
The emphasis on health protection indicates that equivalence is meant for 
sanitary measures only. However, Article 8.1 states that ´each party will recognise 
as equivalent the other Party·s inspection and control systems governing the 
processing, packaging, handling or export of fish and fishery products, in accor-
dance with Annex A.µ Thus, judgements of equivalence are also performed on con-
formity assessment systems. Further, as indicated by the purpose and scope of the 
Agreement, these systems apply to both sanitary and technical measures. Each 
Party will provide the other Party with reasonable efforts for the purpose of 
auditing continued equivalence of the inspection and control systems. 
Annex A to the Agreement further specifies the meaning of equivalence and 
equivalence assessment. It clearly states that equivalence judgements apply to food 
safety measures (sanitary measures), but that ´request for equivalence may be con-
sidered in relation to inspection and control systems, parts of the system, or in 
relation to specific inspection requirements.µ  
Annex A further describes the process of equivalence assessment, stipulating 
assessment of competent authorities and their performance in relation to control 
programs and assurances, as well as legislation and powers in place to ensure that 
domestic and importing Party requirements are met. The criteria for equivalence 
assessments also relate to performance verification, i.e., reviewing 
compliance/audit programs, verifying efficacy of the total program in meeting the 
requirements of the importing Party, and on-site checks at the request of the 
importing Party and necessary following requests for equivalence.  
The equivalence agreement between Canada and Thailand was signed in April 
1997. An important objective of the Agreement is ´to establish a process for recog-
nizing and maintaining equivalence of the fish and fishery products inspection and 
control systemsµ of the two countries. For the purposes of the Agreement equiva-
lence is defined as ´the capability of different inspection systems to achieve the 
same objectivesµ (Article 1a). Article 4 deals with recognition of equivalence. 
According to this provision, the parties recognize each other·s fish and fishery 
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products inspection and control systems insofar as the recognition process is con-
ducted in accordance with the procedures outlined in Annex II to the Agreement.  
Article 4.3 states that ´where differences exist in product standards and labelling 
requirements, the exporting Party will require the establishments identified in 
Annex III to comply with the product standards and labelling requirements of the 
importing Party.µ Thus, in this Agreement a compliance requirement for non-
harmonized technical measures is combined with a judgement of equivalence for 
the conformity assessment systems (food and inspection control). 
The procedures for recognition of equivalence are laid down in Annex II to the 
Agreement. The determination of equivalence is based on the assessment of the 
following criteria with regard to the existence of a national fish and fishery 
products inspection and control system of Canada and Thailand: legislative frame-
work, governmental structures (including identification of the main objectives 
addressed by the inspection and control systems), adequate resources/tools, appro-
priate implementation of mandate, training for inspectors and laboratory personnel, 
inspection and sampling plans, certification systems and enforcement history.  
Annex II also spells out the criteria for the assessment of: 
The identification of fish processing establishments: seafood processors should 
have adopted a system of controls that prevent the occurrence of food-safety 
hazards or other regulatory infractions exported to the other party, and 
Ability to perform audit procedures on the inspection control system: labora-
tories should demonstrate that they have consistently acceptable performance 
through programs that include, inter alia, adequate quality-assurance controls, 
and,  
Verification of equivalence: each Party should verify the equivalence of systems 
to meet import requirements; the verification may include side-by-side com-
parison, review of compliance history or compliance audit. 
 
Canada has thus a number of agreements in place that include equivalence of con-
formity assessment procedures applicable to technical measures. Moreover, these 
agreements specify the criteria on which equivalence assessments are based. 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) is the premier forum for 
facilitating economic growth, cooperation, trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific 
region.28 APEC has a membership of 21 economic jurisdictions,29 a population of 
                                           
 28 See APEC website: http://www.apecsec.org.sg/  
 29 The members are: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People·s Republic of China, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Thailand, United States of America, 
Vietnam. 
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over 2.5 billion and a combined GDP of 19 trillion US dollars, accounting for 47 
percent of world trade. 
APEC has established a multilateral arrangement (MRA) called the APEC 
Mutual Recognition Arrangement on Conformity Assessment of Foods and Food 
Products (´the APEC Food MRAµ). The Food MRA consists of an umbrella 
arrangement, which contains the general provisions that apply to all products and 
sectors that are covered by the MRA, and guidelines for the elaboration of sectoral 
arrangements (Appendix B). Sectoral agreements are in practice the implementation 
of elements pertaining to specific foods or food product sectors. 
The APEC Food MRA is ´a voluntary mechanism designed to facilitate trade by 
minimising food inspection controls at the point of entry into importing economies 
on the basis of assurances provided through pre-export conformity assessment 
(...)µ (APEC undated 2). Determination of equivalence of conformity assessment 
systems could thus be a core element of sectoral arrangements under this frame-
work. 
The umbrella arrangement encourages participants to enter into a process of 
confidence building and closer co-operation, which may lead to participation in 
specific sectoral arrangements. The umbrella arrangement is thus a framework for 
entering into specific mutual recognition agreements. The APEC Sub-Committee 
on Standards and Conformance (SCSC) is the appropriate forum for review and 
discussion of the arrangement. The sectoral arrangements are supposed to be based 
on the principles and guidelines set out in Appendix B to the umbrella arrange-
ment. 
Sectoral agreements involve ´the acceptance by an importing Party that foods 
and food products imported under the provisions of those arrangements conform 
with its legislative, regulatory and administrative requirements on safety, fitness for 
purpose and truth in labellingµ (Article 1.2). Technical as well as sanitary measures 
are thus covered. The basis for acceptance is the exporting Party·s conformity 
assessment systems, which the importing Party has recognised for the purpose of a 
specific sectoral arrangement.  
In effect a participant in an MRA on conformity assessment recognizes the con-
formity assessment procedures of the other(s) as being equivalent (APEC undated 
1). However, under the APEC Food MRA this is not a precondition for partici-
pation in such arrangements (Article 1.4). Still, the arrangements are expected to 
provide the members with confidence in each other·s conformity assessment 
systems and thus reduce the need to reassess the exporting products when entering 
the importing Party·s market. If the conformity assessment systems are judged to 
be equivalent, the products can be assessed prior to export as to their conformity 
with the importing countries· requirements. Thus, for duplicate assessments to be 
avoided equivalence will necessarily play an important part of the MRAs. 
We have so far not been able to come up with examples of sectoral agreements 
being negotiated under the framework of the APEC Food MRA. However, in 
order to facilitate trade in food between the APEC members, there is an ongoing 
effort for the inclusion of more economies in the Food MRA, the achievement of 
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common food related goals of the APEC food system, and the promotion of the 
use of sectoral MRAs between the members (APEC undated 3). 
30
The Export Inspection Council of India (EIC), which is the Official Certifying 
Body of India, is currently working with various governments for the signing of 
MOUs or MRAs on conformity assessment in the food sector. These agreements 
will result in the acceptance of the EIC certification of food exports. The Indian 
conformity assessment procedures will thus be determined to be equivalent to the 
procedures of the importing country in question. 
Arrangements are already in place with the Australian Quarantine and Inspection 
Service (AQUIS) for, inter alia, fishery products, tea, spices and cashew nuts. The 
agreement covering Indian seafood imports follows an AQUIS assessment of 
India·s export controls that have found that the controls are equivalent to 
Australia·s systems. In addition it has confirmed that seafood products imported 
from India consistently have met Australia·s requirements over many years. Ship-
ments of Indian products such as frozen prawns and fish will now be accepted on 
the basis of certification, minimising entry fees and making entry processing more 
efficient. The agreement is based on both India·s compliance with the rules of 
Australia and an equivalence assessment of the Indian conformity assessment 
system for seafood exported to Australia. 
India has also signed an agreement with Sri Lanka to cover more than 80 items, 
which have been under their import control. The recognition of EIC·s export certi-
fication following this agreement will avoid duplication of inspection, sampling and 
tests at two levels ² at the exporting and importing ends. It will also minimise and 
even eliminate rejection at the point of entry with the accompanying high costs of 
recall. Further, such an arrangement would also take care of problems resulting 
from variation in quality due to production by small farmers or enterprises. The 
agreement can thus lead to reduction of trade impediments caused by 
technical/quality measures. The Additional Secretary of the Indian Department of 
Commerce, Mr L.V. Saptharishi, has actually underscored the need for the food 
industry to pay serious attention to the ´quality aspectsµ in the WTO regime and 
thus in world trade.31 
                                           
 30 Part of the information on India·s work on MOUs/MRAs is based on a letter dated 8 July 
2003 from the director of EIC, Ms. Shashi Sareen, to the authors of this report. See also the 
website of AQUIS: http://www.affa.gov.au/content/output.cfm?ObjectID=9DA3A020-
A043-45A9-BD56B82D9FE9DA6D 
 31 See presidential address delivered by Mr. Saptharishi in a seminar on ´WTO Regime and 
Export Certification in Food Sectorµ, organised by EIC, and referred to in a release from the 
Press Information Bureau of the Government of India, 20 November 2002. Available online 
at: http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2001/rnov2001/20112001/r2011200110.html 
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EIC is further negotiating an agreement with Singapore to cover all food and 
agricultural products as well as non-food areas. In addition, dialogue is on with a 
number of other countries such as Canada, Japan and South Korea for signing 
MOUs/MRAs on conformity assessment in the food sector. 
32
The European Community (EC)33 has signed MRAs with seven countries ² all on 
non-food areas: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Israel, Japan, Switzerland and 
United States.34 These agreements all cover mutual recognition of conformity 
assessment procedures. We will take a closer look at one of these agreements ² 
between the EC and the United States ² with an emphasis on how equivalence 
assessment of conformity assessment systems is being handled. 
The MRA between the EC and the United States was signed in 1997. It consists 
of a general framework and six annexes covering mutual recognition of conformity 
assessment in specific sectors: telecommunication equipment, electromagnetic 
compatibility, electrical safety, recreational craft, pharmaceutical good manu-
facturing practises and medical devices.  
The two parties recognize that ´...mutual recognition needs to offer an assurance 
of conformity with applicable technical regulations or standards equivalent to the 
assurance offered by the Party·s own proceduresµ (emphasis by author). Article 3.3 
of the Agreement further states the need for conformity assessment procedures 
utilized to ´...assure conformity to the satisfaction of the receiving Party, with 
applicable legislative, regulatory and administrative provisions of that Party, 
equivalent to the assurance offered by the receiving Party·s own proceduresµ. 
However, unless specified in a sectoral annex, the MRA do not entail the mutual 
recognition of standards or technical regulations (cf. Article 4). 
In Sectoral Annex for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs), 
equivalence of the regulatory systems means systems that are ´...sufficiently 
comparable to assure that the process of inspection and the ensuing inspection 
reports will provide adequate information to determine whether respective 
statutory and regulatory requirements of the authorities have been fulfilledµ (Article 
1.1). It is clearly stated that equivalence does not require that the respective regula-
                                           
 32 Available online on the websites of the United States Food and Drug Administration: 
http://www.fda.gov/oia/mrapage.htm and the European Commission, DG Enterprise: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/international/indexb1.htm 
 33 Here, we use the name European Community (instead of the European Union) because this 
is the name that is used in the agreement itself. 
 34 See website of the European Commission, DG Enterprise: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/international/indexb1.htm 
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tory systems have identical procedures. The provisions of the Annex govern the 
exchange between the Parties· official GMPs inspection reports after a transitional 
period aimed at determination of the equivalence of the regulatory systems. 
Equivalence assessment is thus a cornerstone of the Annex. 
Article 6 of the Annex on Pharmaceutical GMPs spells out in detail the proce-
dures for equivalence assessments. The parties are supposed to establish and 
communicate to each other draft programmes for assessing the equivalence of the 
respective regulatory systems in terms of quality assurance of the products and con-
sumer protection. If necessary, these programmes will be carried out for post- and 
pre-approval inspections and for various product classes or processes. The 
equivalence assessment shall include information exchanges (including inspection 
reports), joint training, and joint inspections for the purpose of assessing regulatory 
systems and the authorities· capabilities.  
Equivalence is established by having in place regulatory systems covering the 
long list of criteria for assessing equivalence for post- and pre-approval referred to 
in Appendix 4, and a demonstrated pattern of consistent performance in accor-
dance with these criteria (Article 9). The Parties shall document insufficient 
evidence of equivalence in sufficient detail to allow the authority being assessed to 
know how to attain equivalence. In order to achieve continued equivalence the 
parties will perform monitoring actives including review of the exchange of 
inspection reports, performance of joint inspections and conductance of training 
sessions (Article 15). 
The annex on medical devices also has provisions on equivalence. For the pur-
poses of this Annex, equivalence means that Conformity Assessment Bodies 
(CABs) in the European Community are capable of conducting product and quality 
systems evaluations against U.S. regulatory requirements in a manner equivalent to 
those conducted by the Food and Drug Administration and vice versa (Article 2) 
(emphasis by author). Confidence building between CABs is an essential part of the 
process of determining equivalence. The CABs that have participated in confidence 
building activities will be determined to be equivalent provided they have 
´...demonstrated proficiency through the submission of a sufficient number of ade-
quate reports (Article 9). 
As mentioned earlier, the EC has signed MRAs with a number of other 
countries. These agreements do not entail mutual recognition of the equivalence of 
standards or technical regulations, as is the case for the MRA with United States. 
Thus, in these bilateral trade agreements the use of mutual recognition is reserved 
for conformity assessment procedures (including GMPs and CABs). 
35
The Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA) involving the 
Australian Parties (the Commonwealth of Australia, six states and two territories) 
and New Zealand was signed in 1998. The objective of the Arrangement is to 
                                           
 35 See website of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new_zealand/ 
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remove regulatory barriers to the movement of goods and service providers 
between Australia and New Zealand and to thereby facilitate trade. TTMRA is an 
umbrella arrangement laying down the principles for the elaboration of specific 
sectoral agreements. 
In respect of goods, the basic principle in the TTMRA is that a good that may be 
legally sold in Australia may also be legally sold in New Zealand, and vice versa. 
Exemptions are made for certain products and for the protection of public health 
and safety and the environment. This way of applying the principle of mutual 
recognition of goods resembles the EU application, as illustrated by the ´Cassis de 
Dijonµ case described in Chapter 1 of this report. Legislation implementing the 
TTMRA overrides any law, with certain exceptions, that regulates the manufacture 
or sale of the goods, including product standards, packaging and labelling and con-
formity assessment requirements. Thus, in this context equivalence is not really an 
issue. The good produced according to the standards and regulations of one 
country is accepted without reservations into the market of the other country.  
Cooperation programmes under the Arrangement are assumed to have three 
possible outcomes: 1) Continued operation of mutual recognition because require-
ments applying in each country are perceived to be adequate from a regulatory 
point of view, 2) Cooperation leads to harmonisation or closer alignments of 
regulatory requirements, which once again will lead to the application of the mutual 
recognition principle, 3) Parties seek an agreement to have a good added to the list 
of permanent exemptions.  
Even though equivalence is not explicitly mentioned in the TTMRA, it may still 
play a role in the process of accepting the other party·s conformity assessment 
procedures. For example, the 1988 Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Governments of Australia and New Zealand on Technical Barriers of Trade, which 
still applies, states that ´...each Government will endeavour to ensure that relevant 
authorities in its country accept test results provided and certificates of conformity 
with technical regulations and requirements issued by competent and authorised 
bodies of the other countryµ.36 The provision further states that ´it is recognised 
that prior consultations may be necessary to arrive at mutually satisfactory under-
standings between relevant bodies in this regardµ. Thus, arrival at mutually satis-
factory understandings could involve equivalence assessments. However, Australia 
and New Zealand are moving towards both uniform standards and certification 
practices also in this area, inter alia, through the establishment of the Joint 
Accreditation System ² Australia and New Zealand (JAS-ANZ). 
The TTMRA includes, with certain exemptions, all goods including food. 
However, food is less relevant than many other goods because of the establishment 
of the joint food regulatory agency, the Australia-New Zealand Food Authority 
(ANZFA), in 1995. ANZFA has contributed to the harmonization of Australian 
and New Zealand food standards, which consequently automatically have been 
mutually accepted for entering the markets of the two parties. The Australia²New 
                                           
 36 See website of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/new_zealand/anz_cer/anz_cer.html 
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Zealand Food Standards System includes the development of technical measures 
related to, e.g., packaging and labelling.  
For the food standards that have not yet been harmonized, a form of mutual 
recognition still applies. In addition, the TTMRA underpins the harmonization 
process to assure that other technical barriers do not exist. The possible inability to 
harmonize should therefore not result in regulatory barriers to the trade of food 
products between the two countries.  
Equivalence is not explicitly a big issue in the TTMRA, although it may play a 
significant role in connection with the process of recognizing each other·s con-
formity assessment procedures under a sectoral arrangement. Thus, equivalence 
assessments are being performed in order to attain mutual recognition of the 
regulatory systems. New Zealand has described the TTMRA as a move to create 
mechanisms for regulatory cooperation that in practice has provided a useful plat-
form for the pursuit of equivalence, as it allowed regulators to share experiences 
and establish mutual confidence (WTO 2003b: 3). Besides, Australia has signed 
several other agreements (e.g. with the EU) where equivalence of conformity 
assessment is an issue.  
The TTMRA illustrates two important points. First, that mutual recognition of 
technical measures takes place in co-operating arrangements outside the EU where 
the concept was developed (cf. the ´Cassis de Dijon doctrineµ). Second, mutual 
recognition (including equivalence) can both facilitate and complement harmoniza-
tion processes. 
In the following sections we look at the towards achieving equivalence 
and/or mutual recognition and some of the conditions for successful co-operation 
between different regulatory systems. Some central questions are asked: What con-
siderations should be made before entering into negotiations on agreements in-
volving equivalence and mutual recognition? How should one go about when 
setting up trade arrangements that include mutual recognition and equivalence 
assessments? 
Based on the empirical examples presented above, we thus explore some impor-
tant issues to be considered when deciding on converging regulatory systems. As 
mentioned in chapter 2, some countries have developed special policy frameworks 
in relation to the process of developing agreements on equivalence and mutual 
recognition (e.g. Canada, EU and Japan). Further, suggestions for considerations to 
be made in these processes can also be extracted from academic literature on the 
subject (e.g. Nicolaodis 1997; Horton and Hastings 1998). In this section we will try 
to summarize some of the main points of these ´recipesµ. These elements may be 
of interest to consider in the further work on guidelines on equivalence and mutual 
recognition in the TBT area. 
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Before entering into negotiations involving equivalence assessments of regulatory 
systems, countries have to analyse the associated costs and benefits. Establishing 
equivalence is both complicated and time-consuming. Countries should thus con-
sider carefully whether they should spend the efforts to entering into negotiations.  
First, a fundamental prerequisite is that serious trade problems exist and that 
these problems can be resolved through this kind of agreement. Further, there 
should be a sufficient volume of trade in specific sectors between the parties 
involved, in order to justify the high administrative costs. In addition, there should 
be a clear potential for tangible economic benefits as a result of the agreement. The 
benefits from the potential agreement should be demonstrated and alternative trade 
facilitating measures must be considered. It is important that the preparatory work 
involve a thorough evaluation of what is the most appropriate regulatory tool to 
use for resolving the trade problems at hand. 
A certain degree of symmetry between the parties· regulatory systems should exist 
before starting negotiations. For instance, sound and effective regulatory infra-
structure calls for three basic elements: food law and accompanying regulations (i.e. 
a legislative and administrative base), qualified trained staff to deal with program-
mes, and performance provisions and well-equipped analytical laboratories and 
other facilities (Malik 1997). Underlying compatibility in the regulatory systems of 
the trading partners will make negotiations easier and the potential for reaping 
gains greater. If the technical competence of the two parties is different there will 
be need for a step-by-step approach. In such situations progress could be made by 
first initiating technical co-operation to bring the levels of competence more in line. 
The generally long-term nature of the negotiations makes it very important to 
assure sufficient resources for negotiation and implementation. There should be a 
political will to put time and efforts into the tasks at hand. Further, there should be 
a will to make compromises among the people employed in regulatory agencies. 
The support from key players is fundamental for a result-oriented process. To 
closely consider and take into account the interest of stakeholders is a prerequisite 
for obtaining successful outcomes of negotiations. 
One way of designing mutual recognition/equivalence agreements is to make an 
effort to include all possible elements and products, i.e. to make the scope as broad 
as possible. This is however a risky endeavour considering the time and resources 
needed to maintain equivalence for all the products and procedures included, and 
to solve the problems that will arise during the operation of such agreements. A 
less risky way is to follow the example of, e.g., APEC, United States, EU and 
Australia and start negotiating an umbrella arrangement that lays down the general 
principles that can be used to guide subsequent sectoral agreements on specific 
products or product groups. Equivalence (of measures or conformity assessment 
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procedures) can thus be established on a case-to-case basis. Moreover, it is easier to 
start equivalence assessments on a few and less complicated elements of the 
regulatory systems (e.g. test results or Good Manufacturing Practises ² GMPs) and 
then move on to more complicated elements.37 Differences between the systems 
will gradually be reduced through continuous equivalence assessments thus leading 
up to a process where national regulatory systems are harmonized. 
A critical lesson to be learned from the examples of harmonisation, equivalence 
and mutual recognition, is that regulatory convergence between parties is a process 
over time that requires information exchange, mutual learning, training and trust 
building. For example, the U.S. FDA has made some efforts in order to overcome 
its mistrust of European Conformity Assessment Bodies. In the process of establi-
shing the US-EC MRA sectoral annex on medical devices, the U.S. FDA organized 
a ´joint confidence building programµ including seminars, workshops, joint training 
exercises and observed inspections (Shaffer 2002: 22). 
Confidence between the parties is thus an important condition for making it 
possible to establish and maintain equivalence. This is particular important with 
regard to the conformity assessment systems. The negotiating parties should thus 
start the process with information sharing and visits to each other·s facilities. 
Further, if necessary the parties can assist each other in building capacity into the 
systems, making the system of the exporting country capable of performing the 
conformity assessments required by the importing country (based on equivalence 
assessments). Joint training and inspections, or exchange of personnel could be 
effective means of strengthening mutual confidence. Lack of trust between the 
parties can be devastating for the potential to reach agreement and achieve the 
results wanted. The importance of building confidence should thus not be under-
estimated. 
The gradual process of establishing mutual recognition and equivalence under a 
general trade framework gives regulatory agencies useful experience in dealing with 
complicated discrepancies between national systems. Further, they may be more or 
less forced into a situation where compromising is an important part of the game. 
Thus, people working inside the regulatory systems may learn from experience the 
best way to solve trade problems resulting from discrepancies in regulatory tradi-
tions and systems. Moreover, it is important for regulatory agencies to search for 
information on how such trade arrangements work for other products and other 
countries, and to evaluate their own arrangements in order to make the necessary 
adjustments along the way. Sometimes, maintaining equivalence may be too costly 
                                           
 37 It interesting to note that the TBT Committee, in its Triennial Review, concluded that in its 
further work would focus on the Member·s experiences with equivalence of GMPs (See 
Annex I of this report). 
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weighed up against the benefits. In those situations, going back to the outset or 
speeding up the process of harmonizing the systems can be better options. 
After the comprehensive presentation of examples in the preceding sections, it is 
time to make some preliminary assessments of the empirical data. 
There are many examples of arrangements involving equivalence assessments of 
conformity assessment procedures. These arrangements often cover conformity 
assessment of both sanitary/phytosanitary and technical food measures. Some of 
the basic elements of equivalence assessments of conformity assessment proce-
dures in the food sector generally seem to be quite similar to the principles of 
assessments being performed in non-food sectors. The same goes for judgement of 
equivalence for technical standards and regulations. It is therefore worthwhile to 
look more careful at the experiences from non-food sectors when considering how equiva-
lence and mutual recognition can apply in food trade arrangements. 
One should note, nevertheless, that equivalence assessments are perceived to be 
more relevant for some products and measures than for others. The decision on 
whether such assessments should be performed thus has to be done on a case-to-case 
basis. As we will come back to later in this report, this is even more so for TBT 
measures than for SPS measures, because of the vast variety of different regulatory 
objectives that may be linked to the former type of measures (cf. the TBT Agree-
ments· more open-ended provisions on what constitutes a legitimate objective). 
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Based on our presentation of actual trade arrangements and a review of documents 
and literature, we will in this chapter pinpoint some critical issues regarding the use 
of mutual recognition and equivalence assessments. First, we make some clarifica-
tions with regard to the concepts of equivalence and mutual recognition in a TBT 
context. Then we look at the application of the concepts on technical regulations and 
standards in connection with the work on achieving equivalence and/or mutual 
recognition through co-operation between different regulatory systems. 
We have shown in this report that equivalence assessments can be performed on 
both rules (regulations, standards) and conformity assessment systems (accredita-
tion, certification, test results, etc.). In order to reduce redundant testing and certifi-
cation requirements, conformity assessment procedures can be used by the exporting 
party either to check the products against the rules of the importing party (cf. 
compliance), or to check the products against national rules, which in advance have 
been harmonized or deemed equivalent and/or mutually recognized. Duplicate 
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inspections, tests and controls when entering the importing country can thus be 
avoided. 
The judgement of equivalence of conformity assessment procedures is thus 
about two or more parties accepting (mutually or unilaterally) each other·s verifi-
cation procedures as equivalent in order to ensure that the traded products 
actually comply to whatever rules are in force. 
The judgement of equivalence of rules, on the other hand, is basically about 
accepting each other·s products as equivalent. This means that some diversity in 
national rules is upheld while at the same time ensuring that the rules in question 
do not seriously undermine (e.g. through requirements regarding labelling or 
quality features) nationally stated regulatory objectives. 
 
Thus, even if rules are harmonized, deemed equivalent or mutually recognized, 
trade impediments can persist because of a lack of convergence between confor-
mity assessment systems (cf. duplicate inspections, tests, control etc). There is thus 
a need for some sort of mutual recognition and/or equivalence of conformity 
assessment systems for the products to be allowed freely into the market of the 
importing country. In an ideal situation, convergence between rules and conformity 
assessment should be pursued simultaneously. Alternatively it could be wise to 
establish equivalence/mutual recognition of conformity assessment before nego-
tiating equivalence of rules. 
The presented examples in this report seem to indicate that it is easier to 
establish equivalence of conformity assessment than for rules. However, these 
issues are strongly interrelated, and it could therefore be interesting to look more 
carefully at those products where full harmonization through international 
standardization is not relevant or even desirable, and where equivalence thus could 
be particularly relevant as a trade-facilitating tool. 
The two concepts ² equivalence and mutual recognition ² often emerge together in 
processes involving convergence of different regulatory systems. However, in this 
report we have tried to illustrate that equivalence and mutual recognition describe 
occurrences at different levels. When evaluating different regulatory systems the key 
concept is equivalence assessments, i.e. the process of judging the conformity 
assessment procedures and/or rules of another country to be equivalent to national 
conformity assessment procedures and/or rules. If equivalence is established, the 
parties can mutually recognize each others systems, e.g. through entering into 
MRAs. The concept of mutual recognition has furthermore been mainly reserved 
for the recognition of conformity assessment procedures.38 However, in practise, 
equivalency of rules may also be part of a broader MRA, as for instance is the case 
in the Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement between New Zealand and 
Australia. Thus, equivalence assessments are the practical task of achieving 
                                           
 38 The EU also applies the concept of mutual recognition to rules (cf. the ´Cassis De Dijonµ 
case and the ´New Approachµ). 
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acceptance for regulatory diversity whereas mutual recognition is achieved when 
equivalence assessments are put into a broader co-operative framework. 
The application of equivalence and mutual recognition is in its infancy. There are 
only a few food agreements that include equivalence assessments of technical mea-
sures and conformity assessment. However, in world trade there are serious trade 
impediments caused by differences in national regulatory systems and measures. As 
a matter of fact, quality requirements and other technical measures have been 
pointed out as a bigger problem for world trade than sanitary measures. The work 
on harmonizing quality requirements has gradually been given a lower priority in 
the CAC and the EU, as well as in many other organizations and countries.  
Thus, in order to reduce trade problems caused by such measures, there is a 
need for considering other trade-facilitating tools (cf. mutual recognition and 
equivalence). Moreover, new controversial issues, e.g. biotechnology, organic 
production, animal welfare and other environmental concerns, have been placed 
high on the international food agenda. Even though some of these issues contain 
elements relevant for the sanitary and phytosanitary area, they are first and fore-
most relevant for the TBT area.39 Thus, the discussion on technical measures as 
trade barriers will probably be even more important in the years to come. Further, 
dealing with these issues is a relevant task for both the CAC (cf. ensuring fair 
practices in food trade) and the WTO (cf. facilitating trade). 
The discussions in both the TBT Committee and in particular the CCFICS, illu-
strate that there are some problems concerning the application of equivalence on 
TBT related food regulations and standards. In the SPS area at least some progress 
has been made in providing international guidance and clarifying the position of 
equivalence under the WTO framework. The discussions in the TBT area are 
characterized by uncertainty and scepticism among the members of the WTO and 
the CAC. We will pinpoint some of the conditions underlying this uncertainty and 
scepticism and make some assessments on the implications of these conditions for 
pursuing equivalence in a TBT context. 
Under the SPS Agreement the way to make equivalence assessments is to compare 
different SPS measures to see if they can achieve the same appropriate level of 
protection (ALOP). Moreover, the legitimate objectives of the agreement are 
protecting human, animal or plant life or health. The agreement further refers to 
risk assessment techniques as preferred ways to determine appropriate levels of 
protection. With the risk of oversimplification, one could therefore claim that the 
SPS Agreement has some relatively clear parameters to be used in equivalence 
                                           
 39 And thus also relevant for the TBT Agreement of the WTO. 
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assessments: Based on risk assessments, the task is to determine whether two different measures 
are capable of ensuring the same appropriate level of protection for human, animal or plant life or 
health. 
Under the TBT Agreement, however, the task of identifying the relevant para-
meters is more difficult. The agreement includes a long non-exhaustive list of 
possible legitimate objectives (Article 2.2). The TBT Agreement says that one 
should take account of the risks of non-fulfilment of the objectives and it further 
refers (once again) to a non-exhaustive list of relevant elements of consideration. 
Such elements are available scientific and technical information, related processing 
technology or intended end-uses of the product. When making judgements of 
equivalence of TBT measures the parties thus have to identify the relevant 
objective among a large number of possible legitimate objectives, then decide what 
is necessary to fulfil this legitimate objective, and finally to find a way to measure 
the risks of non-fulfilment. 
The TBT Agreement is therefore relatively open-ended with regard to how equi-
valence assessments can be performed in concrete situations. However, this does 
not necessarily imply that such assessments are impossible or irrelevant. On the 
contrary, the inherent characteristics of TBT measures allow for a pragmatic 
approach to equivalence, which actually could enhance the use of this as a trade-
facilitating tool. One could argue that health concerns ensured by SPS measures in 
most instances can be considered more vital or essential than, e.g., concerns related 
to quality or product information ensured by TBT measures. Thus, it should be 
easier to accept differences in relation to, for instance, labelling of quality 
properties than in relation to, e.g., maximum level of aflatoxins in food. 
The open-ended character of the TBT measures suggests that it is important to 
consider on a case-by-case basis whether equivalence is relevant. For instance, the 
process of establishing equivalence becomes more complicated when a TBT mea-
sure is based on product requirements in terms of design or descriptive characte-
ristics instead of performance (see below). 
A measure establishing an appropriate level of health protection based on a risk 
assessment constitutes a performance criterion, which allows more easily for an 
equivalence assessment to be performed. The requirements of TBT measures, how-
ever, are often stated in terms of descriptive characteristics, which often are diffi-
cult to clearly separate from the regulatory objectives they are supposed to fulfil. 
Examples of this include the requirement that a cheese must contain exactly 17.5% 
fat and the requirement that the word ´Sardineµ can be used as a trade description 
for canned sardines only when the species Sardina pilchardus is used in production. 
With regard to the second example, because there exists a Codex standard on 
canned Sardines and Codex standards have been deemed as relevant standards 
under the TBT Agreement, the countries no longer have full freedom in deciding 
how to use the trade description ´Sardinesµ.40 The Codex standard states the condi-
                                           
 40 See for example Hauser (2003). 
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tions under which the name ´Sardinesµ can be used. According to the standard, the 
name ´Sardinesµ can be used for ´Sardine-likeµ fish species other than Sardina 
pilchardus, but only in combination with another name (e.g., Chilean Sardines). The 
relevant ´Sardine-likeµ fish species are included in a list, which may be revised by 
the Codex Committee on Fish and Fishery Products to even include more species. 
The Codex standard could thus be described as a move towards equivalence, 
insomuch that the standard allows for variation as to product characteristics (i.e. 
different fish species used in the production) as long as the consumers are infor-
med of this variation trough the labelling of the product. Further, the Codex work 
on deciding which species can be included on the list of ´Sardine-likeµ species, can 
be said to involve some sort of equivalence assessments. The whole logic of 
defining fish species as ´Sardine-likeµ is parallel to the logic of equivalence, which 
is precisely about defining ´likenessµ. Even though the Codex standard (in combi-
nation with the TBT Agreement) to a great extent may ´solveµ the trade problems 
caused by different regulations on canned sardines, some problems persist, such as 
the details on how precisely the ´Sardine-likeµ canned Sardines should be labelled. 
Again, such problems could be solved by equivalence agreements. 
The ´Sardinesµ example illustrates that even though a TBT measure in the outset 
is based on a strict product requirement in terms of product characteristics, it is 
possible to find mechanisms to avoid unnecessary trade impediments. This can be 
done either through international harmonization, equivalence or mutual recogni-
tion, or through a combination of all three. 
When a TBT measure is based on strict requirements on design and product 
characteristics, there are basically only two ways of solving the problem of deter-
mining equivalence. The requirements have to be relaxed either in terms of more 
flexibility in the design itself (e.g., allowing a cheese to include a fat percentage in 
the interval of 15²20%) or by defining a performance criterion (e.g., appropriate 
consumer information) under which different product characteristics can be judged 
equivalent as to achieve this ´appropriate informationµ.  
This same logic also applies to TBT measures based on requirements in terms of 
processes and production methods (PPMs). To give an example: There are a 
number of different standards and regulations for the production of organic food. 
Thus, different criteria are used in different countries to define a food product as 
´organicµ. In determining equivalence, the involved parties thus either must agree 
on some key requirements of processes and production methods to be similar, or 
to define a performance criterion (e.g. environmentally sustainable) under which 
equivalence could be judged. 
There is one last point to be made with regard to the application of equivalence on 
technical food regulations and standards, namely the link between private and 
governmental initiatives. The TBT Agreement encourages agreements for mutual 
recognition of conformity assessment procedures for both governmental and non-
governmental applications. However, the Agreement applies directly to the former 
(Article 6.3) and influences only indirectly on the latter (Article 8.2). The 
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Agreement applies directly to governmental regulations (Article 2) and more 
indirectly to standards (Article 4 and ´Code of Good Practiseµ). The TBT Agree-
ment is thus relevant for both governmental and non-governmental conformity 
assessment bodies and for both mandatory governmental regulations and voluntary 
private standards. 
Both public and private actors are thus involved in the elaboration and appli-
cation of measures, which are covered by the TBT Agreement. This mix of private 
and governmental activities and responsibilities creates a complex picture and has a 
potential for creating confusion among the member states of the WTO and the 
CAC. As the examples from the organic food sector illustrate, there is a need to 
map the variety of both relevant private and governmental international standards 
and guidelines for mutual recognition and equivalence of conformity assessment.  
A reduced number of relevant reference points for the TBT Agreement could 
also enhance the efforts made to converge different regulatory systems through 
harmonization or/and equivalence (cf. the SPS Agreement, which refers to only 
three relevant standardizing bodies). Because the TBT Agreement covers a wide 
range of products, this must be done on a sector-to-sector basis. For example, with 
regard to organic food, there exist a large number of private and semi-private 
standards in addition to a Codex standard ² both on the international and regional 
level. This variation may create co-ordination problems resulting in trade barriers. 
Thus, the TBT Committee, which deals with both governmental regulations and 
private standards, could play a role in facilitating trade through promoting co-
ordination of standardization efforts. Equivalence is relevant in the process of 
reducing the number of relevant international standards (´different standards are 
deemed equivalentµ). A reduced number of reference points may simplify the 
process of determining equivalence between different national regulatory systems. 
In the SPS area, governments are often strongly involved in defining the mea-
sures, mainly because all SPS measures concern essential requirements in terms of 
health protection. As stressed several times, a larger variety of objectives are linked 
to TBT measures. The TBT Agreement furthermore covers a wider spectrum of 
products and measures than the SPS Agreement. The TBT Agreement thus also 
affects a larger variety of actors ² public and private sectors as well as different 
industries. Co-ordination between private and governmental initiatives is thus even 
more relevant and important in the TBT context. 
There are some important differences between SPS and TBT measures, some of 
which also have consequences for the work on achieving equivalence and mutual 
recognition. First of all, at first sight equivalence assessments in the TBT area are 
more complicated and less clear-cut. We nevertheless believe there are no principal 
reasons why such assessments cannot play an important role in the TBT area. 
There is therefore a big potential for applying both equivalence and mutual recog-
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nition on TBT measures. However there are many good reasons to carefully watch 
one·s step when searching for methods and mechanisms to achieve this. As empha-
sised earlier in this chapter, some key factors to remember in such endeavours are 
the open-ended character of the TBT Agreement, the problem of identifying legiti-
mate objectives separate from the TBT measures themselves, the need to separate 
performance criteria from design and product characteristics, and the need to sort 
out the relevance and importance of both private and governmental initiatives in 
providing relevant standards and guidelines. In the next chapter we address the 
implications of these factors for further work on international guidance. 
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In this chapter, we make some final assessments regarding how equivalence and 
mutual recognition may be utilized as trade-facilitating tools in a TBT context. 
Based on our empirical and conceptual presentations in this report, we also pro-
pose some possible ways of pursuing the work on international guidance with 
regard to these issues. 
The variety of national technical food measures (i.e., other measures than sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures) is generally perceived to cause big problems for 
traders, producers and consumers. In such a context, equivalence and mutual 
recognition (in addition to harmonization) can be useful tools in order to facilitate 
trade and ensuring fair trade practices in the food sector.  
With regard to both food and non-food agreements, it is hard to come up with 
many good examples of equivalence assessments being performed on technical 
regulations and standards. This illustrates the complicated (or perceived compli-
cated) process of comparing such measures with the aim of determining equiva-
lence. We nevertheless have identified a few areas where such equivalence assess-
ments are being discussed and tested out. 
Of special interest is the organic food sector where an interesting process is 
going on with the aim of enhancing the use of equivalence and mutual recognition, 
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together with harmonisation, as trade-facilitating tools. This happens on a bilateral 
and multilateral basis with regard to conformity assessment as well as regulations 
and standards. Moreover, the three biggest trading countries in organic food, Japan, 
United States and the EU, all apply these tools today. The organic food sector thus 
represents an example where equivalence assessments and mutual recognition of 
technical regulations and standards are perceived as relevant and potentially 
important for facilitating trade. We argue moreover that there are no good reasons 
why equivalence assessments should not be just as relevant for a wide range of 
other food products. 
The work on equivalence and mutual recognition takes place in two different 
committees in the WTO ² the SPS Committee and the TBT Committee. In their 
efforts to clarify these concepts under the respective agreements, the two 
committees naturally have followed different paths. First of all, the provisions on 
equivalence and mutual recognition are different in the two agreements. Secondly, 
SPS measures are different from TBT measures. Thirdly, the TBT agreement covers 
a wider range of measures and product sectors, as well as governmental and non-
governmental bodies and governmental regulations and private standards. In the 
CAC, however, the work on guidelines on the judgement of equivalence of both 
sanitary measures and technical regulations associated with food inspection and 
certification systems has been carried out in the same committee, namely the 
CCIFCS. Initially, the CCFICS· work on guidelines for sanitary measures was 
parallel to the work on guidelines for technical regulations, which was also reflected 
in early drafts. However, after a while the work on equivalence of technical regula-
tions was halted, whereas the work on sanitary measures progressed, resulting in 
the adoption of new guidelines in 2003. Thus, the work on equivalence of SPS and 
TBT related measures, respectively, has followed different paths in the CAC. 
However, although there are good reasons for separating the TBT and the SPS 
work on equivalence, also in the CAC, we argue that many of the basic principles 
and arguments that apply to the SPS area also apply to the TBT area. In both areas, 
factors such as cost-benefit considerations, confidence building and information 
exchange, enter into the co-operative work as important conditions. Further, in 
both areas, the difficult but nevertheless feasible task is to specify two or more 
different measures and the regulatory objectives they are meant to fulfil, and on this 
basis evaluate the ´likenessµ of the measures. Thus, in principle, the potential for 
applying equivalence to TBT measures is at least as good as for SPS measures. 
So then, what are the thresholds for achieving equivalence, and are these in fact 
higher for TBT measures than for SPS measures? As we discussed in chapter 4, one 
important threshold is defining the regulatory objectives and based on these, setting 
the level (e.g. minimum protection level) that measures must reach. We argued that 
this exercise might be considered to be more complicated for TBT measures than 
for SPS measures. However, the argument could also be turned around. For SPS 
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measures, health protection is the central legitimate regulatory objective. This 
objective is inherently linked to essential requirements and just as importantly, 
national core interests. Hence, if the set level of appropriate health protection 
differs strongly the threshold for achieving equivalence will be very high.  
Many TBT measures, however, are not necessarily linked to such essential 
requirements or core interests. Instead they may be a result of tradition, taste or 
even accidental circumstances. The above-mentioned ´Sardines caseµ serves as an 
example of this. Thus, in many situations, there is not really very much at stake for 
states with regard to relaxing the measures and negotiating equivalence. 
One should note, nevertheless, that equivalence assessments are perceived to be 
more relevant for some products and measures than for others. The decision on 
whether such assessments should be performed thus has to be made on a case-to-case 
basis. This is even more so for TBT measures than for SPS measures, because of 
the vast variety of different regulatory objectives that may be linked to the former 
type of measures (cf. the TBT Agreements· more open-ended provisions on what 
constitutes a legitimate objective). We argue therefore that a more pragmatic 
approach is appropriate when applying equivalence to TBT measures. 
This report has not focused much on the role of developing countries. 
Nevertheless, at this point we think it is useful to make a few comments on the 
issue. The process of negotiating equivalence and mutual recognition between 
regulatory systems is difficult for many developing countries because of, inter alia, 
insufficient administrative resources and weak technical infrastructures. Some of 
these problems are reduced by capacity building programmes initiated by the WTO 
and the United Nations, but many obstacles persist. These problems do not how-
ever, imply that equivalence and mutual recognition are not important mechanisms 
also for developing countries. On the contrary, regulatory requirements of deve-
loped countries often have particular negative effects on trade with developing 
countries, mainly because of the difficulties for these countries in living up to the 
high standards of developed countries. Equivalence, mutual recognition as well as 
international standardization, could thus be beneficial for the developing world ² 
insomuch that trade impediments caused by unnecessarily strict regulatory require-
ments are reduced. As the presentation in Chapter 2 of this report on the work in 
the TBT committee illustrates, several developing countries ² such as Egypt, 
Columbia and Thailand ² are in favour of further exploring the potential for using 
equivalence and mutual recognition in trade facilitation. At first sight, the most 
relevant topic is equivalence of conformity assessment ² not least because with 
regard to several types of requirements, especially health requirements, developed 
countries would not be willing to accept what they consider to be inferior rules of 
developing countries. However, we argue that equivalence of technical regulations 
and standards actually have a potential of being accommodated by some developed 
countries and thus could be important for developing countries. This could at least 
be possible in situations where the measures are not linked to essential require-
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ments or core state interests and consequently where developed countries could be 
more willing and have less to loose on negotiating equivalence.  
There is no clear-cut answer to how to pursue the work on international guidance 
for the judgement of equivalence of technical measures and conformity assessment. 
Moreover, the question of whether or not to pursue the work must be based on an 
assessment of the possible benefits and costs of spending time and resources on 
this work. We will nevertheless make some suggestions for possible strategies for 
continued progress. These suggestions are based on our observations presented 
earlier in this report. 
We have observed that the activities of many international organizations are 
relevant for the work on equivalence and mutual recognition of technical regula-
tions and standards and conformity assessment in the food sector, e.g. WTO, CAC, 
ISO, and IFOAM.  
Presently, there is an important process going on in the TBT Committee of the 
WTO with regard to discussing these issues. The WTO is important for the 
process of these efforts. In line with the TBT Agreement·s reference to the 
relevance of other appropriate international standardizing bodies, the WTO can 
take initiatives to link the work of these organizations to the operation of the TBT 
Agreement. This was actually done when ISO was encouraged to develop guide-
lines for arrangements for the recognition and acceptance of conformity assess-
ment results (see Chapter 2.2.4 of this report). The TBT Committee works on clari-
fying the provisions of the TBT Agreement, including the provisions on equiva-
lence of technical regulations (Article 2.7), equivalence of conformity assessment 
(Article 6,1) and MRAs (Article 6.3). However, most of the practical work on 
developing guidelines on technical issues must take place outside the TBT 
Committee, e.g. in ISO or the CAC.  
To what extent is the CAC the right forum for discussing the issues of equiva-
lence and mutual recognition of technical measures? When mutual recognition 
merely involves compliance with other states· sets of requirements, it is difficult to 
see what role standardization bodies like Codex Alimentarius can play. However, 
mutual recognition may involve a two-way (or multiple way) determination of 
equivalence (e.g. of conformity assessment) and is thus relevant for the Codex 
work on this issue (Gascoine 1999). 
For the time being, however, work on guidelines for the judgement of equiva-
lence of technical measures seems to be a non-starter in the CAC. The issue has 
temporarily been taken off the agenda, but stays on as a work priority through the 
reference to this work in the Medium Term Plan and Strategic Framework for 
2003²3007 (see Annex II). In any case, the CAC remains as the most important 
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international food standardizing body and thus has a natural role to play in the 
discussions on equivalence and mutual recognition of food measures. 
One place to start in pursuing the work is to evaluate the already existing 
relevant CAC guidelines, e.g., Guidelines for the Design, Operation, Assessment 
and Accreditation of Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification 
Systems (CAC/GL 26²1997) and Guidelines for the Development of Equivalence 
Agreements Regarding Food Import and Export Inspection and Certification 
Systems (CAC/GL 34²1999). Based on such evaluations it would be easier to con-
sider the actual need for developing new guidelines on equivalence of technical 
measures, including conformity assessment procedures.  
Further, internationally, it may be useful to evaluate the activities of other inter-
national bodies concerning both their application of the concepts of mutual recog-
nition and equivalence of technical measures and conformity assessment proce-
dures, and the possible need for additional international guidance. Examples of 
relevant work of other international organizations are: IFOAM·s work on standards 
for organic food, and ISO·s work on quality requirements (ISO 9000), environmen-
tal challenges (ISO 14000) and conformity assessment in general (ISO Develop-
ment Manual 2 for conformity assessment, ISO/IEC Guide 68:2002: ´Arrange-
ments for the recognition and acceptance of conformity assessment resultsµ).  
An evaluation of existing international work could be a first step in the direction 
of co-ordinating different international standards and guidelines (intergovernmental 
and private) with the aim of reducing the complexity and getting a clearer picture of 
both existing relevant standards and guidelines, and the possible need for further 
development. The relevance of this work for the CAC is actually stated in the 
Statutes of the CAC. Article 1(b) of the Statutes says that one of the purposes of 
the CAC is: ´promoting coordination of all food standards work undertaken by 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations.µ 
The experiences from the work on guidelines on equivalence of sanitary measures 
illustrate that there is also a need for co-ordinated national initiatives in order to 
move the work forward. This is especially true for intergovernmental organizations 
such as the WTO and the CAC. When some of the leading countries, e.g., the 
United States or the EU, are passive or resistant to continuing the work on certain 
issues, the process tends to halt. Thus, in order to progress the work, it is of utmost 
importance to provide convincing information and arguments (if these exist) in co-
operation with other willing states.  
With regard to the issue of equivalence of technical measures there is another 
problem, namely that the states themselves are not necessarily co-ordinated in their 
inputs to international organizations. An illustration of this is New Zealand·s inputs 
to the TBT Committee and the CCFICS on the relevance and importance of 
equivalence of technical regulations. In the WTO, New Zealand is one of the most 
active and progressive states in promoting equivalence as a trade-facilitating tool 
with regard to technical regulations, conformity assessment as well as voluntary 
standards. New Zealand has consequently provided several examples of these 
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mechanisms being applied by the New Zealand government in negotiations with 
other states. In the CCFICS, however, New Zealand has supported the efforts to 
move the issue off the agenda.  
One possible explanation for this seemingly inconsistent behaviour is that the 
TBT Committee and the CCFICS delegates are not the same persons. The dele-
gates that meet in the TBT Committee are often diplomats. Moreover, a variety of 
people from different parts of the national regulatory systems are involved in TBT 
work. The CCFICS work, however, is dominated by food, health and veterinary 
regulators. Thus, there may exist a ´translationµ problem with regard to convincing 
members of the CAC in general and the members of the CCFICS in particular, that 
the TBT Agreement is relevant for food regulations and standards. Further, there 
also seems to be a problem in convincing members of the CAC that the discussion 
on equivalence and mutual recognition in the TBT Committee is relevant for the 
food sector (and thus the CAC) in addition to other product sectors. 
One important challenge is thus to find good arguments for the relevance of 
technical measures for the work on facilitating food trade. Furthermore, it would 
be necessary to reduce the scepticism among many of the member states of WTO 
and CAC in order to move the work on international guidance forward. 
As the previous sections illustrates, there is still a need for further clarification on a 
number of issues regarding equivalence and mutual recognition with relevance for 
technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment. Moreover, confidence 
building, including sharing and exchange of information, remains a crucial issue. 
This applies both to the process of negotiating equivalence and mutual recognition 
agreements, and to the process of discussing and co-ordinating these TBT-related 
activities internationally. Thus, further work could include co-ordinated analysis of 
available information on equivalence and mutual recognition of TBT measures. 
These efforts could include identification and sorting out of some core elements of 
equivalence assessments, which could provide the basis for proceeding with the 
work. Such efforts could take place on a bi- and multilateral basis as well as in the 
TBT Committee. One could also arrange workshops and have presentations on the 
relevance of equivalence and mutual recognition for technical measures in general 
and technical food measures in particular. Discussions could also take place in 
appropriate fora where representatives of intergovernmental, private as well as 
semi-private international organizations could meet. Such joint efforts involving 
sharing of information could contribute to confidence building and further 
clarification on the role of equivalence and mutual recognition in a TBT context. 
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We have provided some examples of equivalence and mutual recognition being 
applied in food trade arrangements. However, there is considerable variation as to 
how the concepts are applied. Further, there are few reports of ´success storiesµ. 
On the contrary, the resources and time needed for entering into and maintaining 
mutual recognition and equivalence arrangements are often considered to outweigh 
the benefits.  
Many countries nevertheless choose to sign such agreements, and the agree-
ments obviously seem to contribute to the reduction of trade barriers, at least with 
regard to conformity assessment systems, which is what most equivalence and 
mutual recognition agreements seem to concentrate on. Another interesting 
observation is that trade arrangements involving equivalence and mutual recogni-
tion also can lead to a harmonization process between the parties, i.e., a process 
where different regulatory systems converge. Moreover, some prior convergence 
between regulatory systems, e.g. by applying the same or similar international 
standards, seems to enhance negotiations on equivalence and mutual recognition 
agreements. Mutual recognition and equivalence are thus important trade-facili-
tating tools, but nevertheless should be studied and applied in combination with 
international harmonisation and standardization.  
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12.  At the Second Triennial Review, the Committee reiterated the importance of 
giving positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations of 
other Members as provided for under Article 2.7. The Committee also noted that, 
as an interim measure until suitable international standards were developed, in 
some cases, standardizing bodies or regulators in some Members had chosen to 
accept as equivalent standards originating from other Members, even though these 
standards differed from their own, on the basis that such standards fulfilled their 
objectives.  
13.  For the Third Triennial Review, the Committee notes that equivalency can be 
an element of good regulatory practice (and is also relevant to conformity assess-
ment as foreseen under Article 6.1). Moreover, it should not detract from the deve-
lopment of international standards. In considering equivalence, Members must 
have regard to their general obligations, including those with respect to transpa-
rency and non-discrimination. 
 
Recommendations 
14. The issue of good regulatory practice is important, evolving, and worthy of 
further discussion in the TBT Committee. To further its work on good regulatory 
practice, the Committee agrees to: 
- Invite Members to exchange experiences related to the identification of 
elements of good regulatory practice at the domestic level; 
- continue its exchanges on Members· experiences and focus its discussion, on, 
inter alia, choice of policy instruments, mandatory versus voluntary measures, 
and the use of regulatory impact assessments to facilitate good regulatory 
practice; and to 
- initiate a process of sharing experiences on equivalency in the Committee 
particularly with regard to how the concept is implemented in practice. 
 
 
 
                                           
 41 See WTO (2003f). 
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38. The Committee notes that, under Article 6.3 ´Members are encouraged, at the 
request of other Members, to be willing to enter into negotiations for the 
conclusion of Agreements for the mutual recognition of results of each other's 
conformity assessment procedures.µ Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs) are 
one of the approaches foreseen to facilitate the acceptance of conformity assess-
ment results. The Committee notes, as indicated under Article 6, that appropriate 
confidence building measures, including accreditation, could facilitate the accep-
tance of conformity assessment results without entering into MRAs. 
39. The Committee notes that MRAs can be negotiated between governments with 
respect to specific regulations, or can be voluntary arrangements between domestic 
and foreign conformity assessment bodies. The Committee notes that while MRAs 
can be a useful approach to facilitate acceptance of conformity assessment results, 
there may be difficulties faced in their negotiation and implementation. There are 
various considerations for the conclusion of effective MRAs between governments, 
such as: a sound regulatory infrastructure, and a sufficient volume of trade in 
specific sectors between the parties involved to justify the high administrative costs 
and the generally long-term nature of the negotiations. The following factors may 
also need to be taken into consideration in the establishment of MRAs: tangible 
economic benefits; interest of stakeholders; support from key players; underlying 
compatibility in the regulatory systems of the potential MRA parties; and sufficient 
resources for MRA negotiation and implementation. Moreover, a step-by-step 
approach may be useful to conclude an MRA, in particular, where the technical 
competence of the two parties is not equivalent. In this respect, progress could be 
made by means of technical cooperation to obtain mutual benefits.  
 
Recommendations 
Work Programme 
40. With a view to improving Members' implementation of Articles 5²9 of the 
Agreement and promoting a better understanding of Members· conformity assess-
ment systems, the Committee agrees to the following work programme to: 
- Exchange information and experiences on existing conformity assessment 
procedures and practices, the use of relevant international standards, guides and 
recommendations, and the participation of Members in national, regional and 
international accreditation schemes; 
 
- exchange information and experiences and hold a workshop on SDoC covering 
issues such as: the regulatory authorities, sectors and suppliers which use 
SDoC; the surveillance mechanism, liability law and penalties used to ensure 
that products comply with requirements; the incentives for suppliers to comply 
with requirements; and the legislation that underpins the relationship between 
buyers and sellers; 
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- invite representatives from relevant international and regional accreditation fora 
to provide information on their operation and the participation of Members, in 
particular, developing country Members, in their systems. Moreover, users, 
such as certification bodies, should also be invited to share their experiences in 
this respect; and to  
 
- hold a workshop on the different approaches to conformity assessment, 
including on the acceptance of conformity assessment results. 
 
41. The Committee will take stock of the progress made on this Work Programme 
and reflect it in its Annual Report to the Council for Trade in Goods. 
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7. In many countries, effective food control is undermined by the existence of 
fragmented legislation, multiple jurisdictions and weaknesses in surveillance, 
monitoring and enforcement. Sound national food control and regulatory systems 
are essential to assuring the health and safety of domestic population as well as 
assuring the safety and quality of foods entering international trade. While the 
establishment of regulatory framework is fundamentally a national responsibility, 
the CAC and its parent bodies, the FAO and WHO, have a strong interest in pro-
moting national regulatory systems that are based on international principles and 
guidelines and address all components of the food chain. The development of 
sound food control and regulatory infrastructure including human resources is 
particularly important for developing countries as they seek to achieve higher levels 
of food safety and nutrition and will require high level political and policy commit-
ment as highlighted in the report of the 1999 Melbourne Conference on 
International Food Trade Beyond 2000.An effective food control system is critical 
in enabling all countries to assure the safety of their foods entering international 
trade and to ensure that imported foods conform to national requirements. 
Successful negotiation of bilateral mutual recognition and/or equivalence also 
depends on the ability of countries to assure each other of the integrity of national 
regulatory systems. 
 
8. The priorities for the CAC in the development of international standards and 
related texts will be to:  
provide essential guidance for member countries through the continued 
development of international standards and guidelines relating to food safety and 
hygiene, nutrition, labelling and import/export inspection and certification 
systems and for the practical application of the concepts of equivalence and 
mutual recognition ; and  
promote the development of national food control systems based on 
international principles and criteria for the reduction of health risk along the entire 
food chain. 
 
 
(emphasis by the authors of this report) 
                                           
 42 See: ´Strategic Framework of the Codex Alimentarius Commission for 2003-2007µ. 
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1. Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Inspection and 
Certification of Fish and Fishery Products Traded between Australia and 
Canada 
Under the Agreement the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service and the 
Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans recognizes the principle of 
equivalency in connection with ensuring that imported and exported products are 
safe and wholesome, are not tainted or decomposed or fraudulently presented. 
Thus, we see that non-safety objectives are mentioned, which indicate that techni-
cal food measures are covered. 
 
2. Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Inspection of Fishery 
Products between Ecuador and Canada 
The Agreement covers labelling and Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs), 
including ensurance of good quality, and is thus relevant for technical measures and 
conformity assessment. 
  
3. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency and the Directorate of Fisheries of Iceland 
The Agreement involves exchange of information on technical measures/confor-
mity assessment procedures and other measures that may cause impediments to 
trade. 
 
4. Arrangement on the Mutual Recognition of Fish and Fishery Products 
Inspection and Control Systems Between the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency and the Directorate General of Capture Fisheries of the Department 
of Marine Affairs and Fisheries of the Republic of Indonesia 
The Agreement defines consumer protection as ´the requirements that exists with 
respect to the acceptable quality or proper identification of fish and fish productsµ. 
Thus, it is relevant for technical/quality requirements. 
 
5. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Japan Canned Food 
Inspection and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans of Canada 
                                           
 43 The full text of these agreements can be found on the website of the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency: www.inspection.gc.ca/. 
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The Agreement includes provisions to determine compliance of labelling and is 
thus relevant for technical measures/conformity assessment. 
 
6. Cooperation Program on Export of Raw Oyster Products Between the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare of Japan and the Canadian Food Inspection 
Agency 
The purpose and scope of the Agreement is to facilitate the export of raw oyster 
products from Canada to Japan in a manner that ´ enhances public health and pro-
tects consumers from unwholesome oysters and from false, misleading or decep-
tive labelling practices (..) Thus, the Agreement is relevant for technical measures. 
 
7. Equivalency Arrangement on Control Measures for the Safety and Quality 
of Fish and Fishery Products Between the Government of 1ew =ealand·s 
Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health and the Government of 
Canada·s Department of Fisheries and Oceans. 
Technical measures are covered by the objective of the Agreement, which is to 
´facilitate bilateral trade in fish and fish products in a manner that protects public 
health, and protects consumers from unwholesome fish and fishery products and 
from false or misleading or deceptive labelling practicesµ. 
 
8. Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Inspection of Fish 
Products Between the Department of Health, Bureau of Food and Drugs, of 
the Government of the Republic of Philippines and the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans of the Government of Canada 
The Agreement is relevant for technical measures/conformity assessment through 
the inclusion of, inter alia, GMPs and labelling. 
 
9. Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of 
Thailand on the Equivalence of Fish and Fishery Products Inspection and 
Control Systems 
The Agreement is relevant for technical measures/conformity assessment through 
the inclusion of provisions on processing and proper identification, including 
labelling. 
 
 
 
 
